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This study uses critical posthumanism to explore the representation of the robot in Steven 
Spielberg’s A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001), Alex Garland’s Ex Machina (2015) and Jake 
Schreier’s Robot and Frank in relation to posthuman embodiment, intersubjectivity and cultural 
anxieties about the interface between humans and robots. By conducting a close reading of 
the films’ mise-en-scene, cinematography and iconography, this thesis argues that while these 
films draw attention to the fears and anxieties associated with robots, the representation of an 
interconnected, posthuman robot enables the films to critique the anthropic principle and 
anthropocentrism. This thesis argues that by blurring and displacing the boundaries between 
human and machine, artificial and natural, organic and inorganic, these films challenge the 
structures of exclusion and demarcations established by humans and explore the implications 
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Robots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) have steadily been advancing and progressing, leaving 
their mark on society as they revolutionise and shape the path for a posthuman future. Science 
fiction (SF) and SF film have often inspired inventions and innovations in robotics and AI 
through their uncanny technological visions and predictions of the use of robotics. Indeed, 
Annette Kuhn writes that SF films ‘relate to the social order through the mediation of ideologies 
[and] society’s representation of itself’ and she elaborates that ‘the films speak, enact [and] 
even produce certain ideologies’ (1990: p.10). SF thus ‘plays on current controversies about 
technological innovations or scientific discoveries, which can provide a source of dramatic 
tension and contemporary relevance’ (King and Krzywinska, 2000: p.3). It has influenced one 
of society’s most prolific and greatest technological inventions: the robot. The word robot first 
originated from the Czech term robota which signified ‘forced labour’, and it first appeared in 
Karel Čapek’s (1880-1938) 1920 play, Rossum’s Universal Robots (R.U.R.). The destruction 
wrought by mechanical and chemical weapons during World War I influenced Čapek who 
became interested in the possibilities of science and technology (Jordan, 2019).  In R.U.R. the 
robots perform the tasks that humans prefer not to do. The play thus ‘gave birth to the robot’ 
(Jordan, 2019). It set the tone for later literary representations of robotics, showcasing how 
SF has always influenced robotics to the extent that the term robot derives from a literary text.  
 
 
This thesis will explore how the representation of the robot in Steven Spielberg’s A.I. Artificial 
Intelligence (2001), Alex Garland’s Ex Machina (2015) and Jake Schreier’s Robot and Frank 
(2012) questions and challenges the borders and boundaries of identity creation. Through the 
6 
 
theoretical lens of critical posthumanism, this thesis argues that the chosen films offer a new 
perspective on robotics through their critique of the anthropic principle and anthropocentrism. 
This encourages audiences to feel with the non-human other, regard the non-human as 
human and empathise with them. This thesis uses critical posthumanism to scrutinise modes 
of exclusion and cultural representations of the human as superior. Whilst many SF films 
explore the robot as a ‘pathological cyborg’ (Redmond, 2004: p.156)1, this thesis argues that, 
through the portrayal of intersubjective, interconnected robots and the exploration of the 
cutting-edge of robotics, these films envision a posthumanity in which robots and humans will 
coexist and coevolve and argues that these films engender a vision of an interconnected 
being. However, at the same time, these films express anxieties about posthuman futures, 
and robots specifically.  
 
 
Each film, A.I. Artificial Intelligence, Ex Machina and Robot and Frank, features the trope of 
humanoid robots and engages with current socio-political trends and debates in robotics and 
AI. I have chosen contemporary films for this study as they represent contemporary culture 
and ‘extrapolate from already discernible trends to shape the kind of world these trends may 
eventually bring into being’ (Finn, 2018). These films thus plant the seeds for the future in the 
present and help us to imagine a society in which robots and AI are embedded and a part of 
everyday life. Sheryl Vint articulates that as science and technology continue to shape our 
lives, the language of ‘technoculture’, which is featured in these films, establishes a 
posthuman future through the dreams and nightmares it offers for our contemplation; 
contemporary science fiction film therefore literalises metaphor and the impossible, often 
deemed visionary, future (2014: p.10). These films thus highlight how SF film contributes to 
shaping the future as they allow us to engage with current trends in robotics and AI. The 
chosen films additionally anticipate how these trends will restructure human society and 
 
1 I will discuss the cyborg in greater detail on page 22. 
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displace traditional notions of western humanism. Through evaluating the past and present 
and predicting the future, these films ask vital questions about the human condition. Jennifer 
Carnevale explains that the human condition is the nature of the human being - the positive 
and negative aspects of the human, such as birth, love, death, emotionality, aspiration and 
mortality (2017). The humanoid in each film dismantles human subjectivity, sovereignty and 
universality, causing us to question our uniqueness and sense of self. If sentience, 
consciousness and empathy are reserved solely for humans, what does it mean to be human 
in an age where humanoid robots similarly exhibit empathy, sentience and consciousness? 
How are humanoid robots becoming human-like and inviting empathy and sympathy?  
 
 
The films do not always produce optimistic or entirely satisfactory answers to these questions 
and this thesis therefore aims to explore how SF film addresses these questions and to explore 
the role of SF film in raising ethical issues that lie at the heart of technological and scientific 
development. I will examine how the chosen SF films engage with contemporary innovations 
in robotics and how they envision a posthuman future in which robotics and AI will be 
widespread. Each film features a different form of the humanoid robot: an all-loving child robot 
(David) in A.I. Artificial Intelligence, a sexualised female robot (Ava) in Ex Machina, and a care 
robot (Robot) in Robot and Frank. Each of these humanoid robots is built with a specific 
purpose in mind: David is designed to fill the childless void many families face; Ava is a product 
of the heterosexual male’s desire and was created as an experiment, and  Robot fulfils the 
role of the carer. Although these robots have different roles, the chosen films nevertheless 
collectively offer the posthuman promise of a sentient, conscious and humane robot and 
through this representation, the films critique the Anthropos which thus represents a shift from 
monism to interrelatedness. Interrelatedness refers to the coexistence between humans and 
non-humans. The interrelation between human and non-human is a ‘transformative or 
symbiotic relation that hybridises and alters the ‘nature’ of each one and foregrounds the 
middle ground of their interaction’ (Braidotti, 2013: p.79). The shift from monism to 
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interrelatedness therefore destabilises the boundaries between the human and non-human by 
heightening the interface between these boundaries. However, as stated above, the films do 
not always produce optimistic representations of robotics in society. This thesis unpicks how 
the films address the otherness, the anxieties and fears of robots. This therefore draws 
attention to how the films both invest in and challenge cultural anxieties.  
 
Ethical implications of the use of robots in contemporary society 
 
From healthcare, education and aerospace, to industry, entertainment and the military, robots 
are incrementally advancing and being utilised in a wide range of settings and are no longer 
just a dream of SF and SF film. The coexistence between robots and humans is increasing 
and the developments in robotic technology therefore raise crucial ethical concerns.  
 
As robotic assistance is becoming more and more embedded into domestic and social 
settings, through the use of digital virtual assistants for example, ethical issues surrounding 
privacy have been raised. Examples of digital virtual assistants are Amazon’s Echo, more 
commonly referred to by its voice-activation system Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana 
and Google Assistant. These virtual assistants are designed to interact with users, play music, 
make texts and calls, provide weather, traffic and sports reports and other real-time 
information. As of 2019, more than 100 million Amazon Echo devices have been sold (Bohn, 
2019). It has been predicted by Ovum, a technology research firm, that by 2021, there will be 
almost as many voice-activated assistants on the planet as people (Shulevitz, 2018). While 
these figures signal the ubiquity of robotic assistance, they simultaneously raise questions 
with regards to their popularity. Multiple disconcerting incidents of privacy mishaps have been 
reported, highlighting the encroaching and, arguably, alarming nature of these technologies. 
In 2017, when an Amazon user asked to listen to an archive of his recordings from his voice 
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assistant, he was ‘mistakenly’ sent 1,700 audio files from a stranger’s recordings with a female 
companion. This provided him sufficient information to name and locate the stranger (Shaban, 
2018), thus violating Data Protection and privacy laws. This raises concerns regarding privacy 
as these devices colonise intimate spaces, from the living room to the bedroom. These devices 
have the potential to reinvent an Orwellian nightmare of surveillance, of an always-on, always-
watching, always-monitoring device. Many sceptics have deemed these devices as invasive 
and ‘wiretapping’ (Estes, 2017) and the use of and proliferation of them therefore causes us 
to question our safety. Are we becoming complacent in our use of and acceptance of invasive 
technology? Will the rise of assistive technology eviscerate and make obsolete the 
fundamental and vital notion that is privacy?  
 
The issue of privacy and surveillance has similarly been raised with the increased use of 
drones. A drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and is used for military purposes; it has 
a camera inbuilt and is used in situations where manned flight is too risky or difficult. The drone 
provides 24-hour monitoring and sends back real-time images of activity on the ground (BBC 
News, 2012). As drones are used for surveillance and intelligence, this raises a number of 
questions such as, who is accessing the data and information? John M. Jordan similarly asks: 
‘What are the rights of the observed and the responsibilities of the observer? Are drone pilots 
or robot software writers subject to the Geneva Convention?’ (2016: p.12) The development 
of surveillant technology thus endangers the safety and privacy of the observed. 
 
Amongst these advances in robotics and AI, the humanoid robot is perhaps the most cutting-
edge development and creation. The humanoid robot is a robot that resembles the human 
body and is designed to interact with humans in a social setting. Pepper, for example, a semi-
humanoid robot manufactured by SoftBank Robotics in 2014, is designed to recognise human 
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faces and emotions and is designed to facilitate social interaction. Pepper is thus used in 
social settings such as helping customers in retail stores, hospitals and hotels. In 2016, 
hospitals across Belgium began using Pepper to interact with patients and today, over 2,000 
worldwide companies use Pepper as an assistant to communicate and interact with customers 
(SoftBank Robotics). These figures not only point towards the popularity of humanoid robots, 
but the benefits of them also; one being that they reduce the dependence on others (Sharkey 
and Sharkey, 2010: p.123). Another example of the use of robots in social settings is the use 
of Paro. Paro is an advanced therapeutic robot seal that was created by AIST in Japan in 
2004. Paro was designed to be a companion for older patients and people suffering from 
psychological disorders. Ethicist Sherry Turkle (2011) found that Paro was highly received by 
patients who reported that they considered robots as friends and confidants. The positive 
reception of these robots suggests a move to a posthuman society where robots and humans 
will coexist. Although these robots have been received positively, they ultimately raise the 
ethical concern that these developments can reduce interaction between people. For example, 
as Pepper is designed to help customers, this may eliminate a valuable opportunity for 
interaction between the consumer and the consultant. Thus, the use of these robots can 
endanger moments of interaction amongst people and can remove vital opportunities for 
bonding via social communication.  
 
The use and existence of humanoid robots has also raised ethical concerns about robot rights. 
Sophia the robot for example, a social humanoid robot developed by Hanson Robotics in 2016, 
was granted citizenship in 2017 by Saudi Arabia, making her the world’s first robot citizen. She 
also became the first robot Innovation Ambassador for the United Nations Development 
Programme. Sophia’s role is to assist in research, medicine, education and entertainment and 
to promote public discussion about AI ethics and the future of robotics. Amongst Hanson 
Robotics’ utopian vision for greater human and AI collaboration, is the goal for Sophia to 
11 
 
achieve true sentience and autonomy. Sophia thus embodies the technophilic dreams of 
roboticists and avid tech fans for the future of AI. On the topic of robot rights and 
responsibilities David J. Gunkel, author of Robot Rights, argues: ‘if artificial intelligence is 
achieved and widely deployed (or if they can reproduce and improve themselves) calls may 
be made for human rights to be extended to robots’ (2018: p.35). Similarly, Wendell Wallach 
and Colin Allen note that ‘when or if future artificial agents should acquire legal status of any 
kind, the question of their legal rights will also arise’ (2009: p.204). Thus, the positions held by 
Sophia have raised a number of Blade Runner-esque questions (Stone, 2017) such as: What 
rights does she uphold? Can she be rendered a moral agent? Will robots and humans 
converge and coexist as equal entities?  
 
The ethical concerns discussed highlight a need for a set of rules or boundaries in order to 
protect the human designer, user and consumer. As mentioned, SF significantly influenced, 
and continues to influence the use of AI and robotics in contemporary society. Thus, as early 
as the 1940’s when robots became a popular feature in SF, Isaac Asimov (1920 - 1992), a 
revered pioneer in the writings of robotics, published the visionary Three Laws of Robotics as 
a set of rules. They are as follows: 
First Law: A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a 
human being to come to harm.   
Second Law: A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where 
such orders would conflict with the First Law.   
Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does 
not conflict with the First or Second Law (Asimov, 1940). 
Although Asimov’s Laws of Robotics were established as a precautionary measure, many 
critics have pointed out the flaws of the laws, addressing their inefficacy and unfeasibility. For 
instance, scholars Robin R. Murphy (roboticist and computer scientist) and David D. Woods 
(integrated systems engineer and cognitive psychologist) question the feasibility of Asimov’s 
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Laws and propose a set of alternative, realistic new laws based on what ‘human and robots 
can accomplish as joint cognitive systems, and their mutual accountability for their actions 
from the perspectives of human-centred design and human-robot interaction’ (2009: p.15).  
Lee McCauley similarly argues that ‘even though knowledge of the Three Laws of Robotics 
seems universal among AI researchers, there is the pervasive attitude that the Laws are not 
implementable in any meaningful sense’ (2007: p.153). Murphy and Woods assert that 
‘Asmiov’s laws are based on functional morality, which assumes that robots have sufficient 
agency and cognition to make moral decisions’ (2009: p.15). They argue that this is 
fundamentally problematic and propose an alternative first law: ‘A human may not deploy a 
robot without the human–robot work system meeting the highest legal and professional 
standards of safety and ethics’ (p.19). This law thus assigns liability and accountability to the 
human designer as a legal requirement to deter the designer from evading responsibility and 
displacing blame upon the robot/computer. As these laws are now rarely considered, this 
highlights how the ubiquity of robotics is establishing a posthuman society in which humans 
and robots are converging. The posthuman notions of coexistence and coevolution will be 
explored in this thesis. 
  
 
Representations of robots in SF and SF film 
 
Humanoid robots, AI, humanity and inhumanity have often been the subject of contemporary 
SF and SF film. SF film has ‘prefigured the dominant issues of postmodern culture’ (Bukatman, 
1989: p.19); specifically, the robot is a predominant signifier in SF film for technological 
innovation, futurism and scientific advancement. As Sean Redmond articulates, ‘science fact 
and fiction merge and collapse in the postmodern world, where the real is as much science as 
the fiction itself, and where the science fiction is - or becomes - credible or authentic as fact’ 
(2004: ix).  As a signifier of futurism and posthumanity, the robot in SF film has thus been 
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explored in relation to ideas of progression and cultural anxieties at the possibility of a robot 
species. The majority of scholarship on robotics and AI in SF film has focused on the robot as 
a threat and while there are instances of this in the chosen films, this thesis draws attention to 
how the representation of the robot establishes ideas of intersubjectivity and 
interconnectedness and  suggests that this deconstructs the anthropic principle. 
 
There is a trend in SF film to present robotic technology as a threat to human 
subjectivity as can be seen in the following films: Blade Runner (1982), Ghost in the 
Shell 2: Innocence (2004), The Terminator (1984), Terminator 2: Judgement Day 
(1991) and Transformers (2007 - 2011). Seung-Hyun Park writes that in Blade Runner 
‘the perversion of human rationality is disclosed through re-examining the existence 
of replicants and the human nature’ (2012: p.98), highlighting how the robot 
undermines human subjectivity. Similarly, Daniel Hourigan analyses Ghost in the Shell 
2: Innocence in relation to subjectivity and questions ‘what remains of being human 
and the assemblage of humanity when the human and the machine collide and elide 
their limit of differentiation’ (2013: p.51). He further asks:  
Are we to expect an artificial posthumanity where everything becomes a 
technological fabrication? Or, is there an invitation to rupture both the ontological 
notion of human being and the conceptualisation of technology in the elision of 
their difference as the definition of humanity is encoded in a technological 
framework? (2013: p.51).  
Hourigan writes that these questions relate to the way that Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence 
establishes humanity in the film by renaming subjectivity as a ‘ghost’ (2013: p.51). He finds 
that the subject is bound by the weight of their ghost, of machines with subjectivity and the 
subject’s humanity becomes a malleable, technical object to be fabricated (2013: p.66).  Doran 
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Larson similarly examines The Terminator franchise in relation to human-robot interface. 
Larson suggests that the audience is taught to identify with the reprogrammed T101 and 
acknowledges that T101 is not a machine with flesh. She thus articulates in alarmist fashion 
that embracing the machine as machine ‘signals the desperation with which we appear to take 
the machine into a public consciousness of national identity’ (1987: p.188). Thus, like Ghost 
in the Shell 2: Innocence and Blade Runner, The Terminator franchise similarly expresses a 
fear that through the machine-human symbiosis, robotic technology dismantles and threatens 
human subjectivity. This fear is further expressed by Nayar who explores The Terminator 
franchise in similar fashion. He writes that ‘the threat is not from a machine that is ruthless in 
its intent, but from the condition that the machine can morph into anything it wants to be’ (2013: 
p.79). Nayar further notes that it is in this ‘ontological cross-over’ where the machine bears 
similarity to the human, being taken for and passing as human, that frightens us (2013: p.79). 
Another example of posthuman ontologies which poses a threat can be seen in the 
Transformers (2007 - 2011) films by Michael Bay. Nayar elaborates that in these films cars 
and trucks morph into machines and transform to jeopardize the human race. He argues that 
this threatens to undermine the human as an autonomous subject: ‘the age of the 
integral/integrated, bounded body and identity is over: all are multiples, fluid, networked and 
capable of morphing into, or connecting with, some other body/ies as never before’ (2013: 
p.79). This anxiety is expressed in SF film and therefore correlates with current debates in 
robotics and AI engendering a posthuman society in which humans will no longer be the 
sovereign subjects. This thesis similarly engages with how the chosen films address concerns 
of ontological crossovers and the human-robot assemblage. However, this thesis offers a 
more holistic, well-rounded perspective by exploring how the films establish a posthuman 
future where robots and humans will co-evolve and co-exist.  
 
Prior research focusing on the reception of AI and robotics in film has similarly flagged fear as 
being a prominent emotion towards AI. Yuhua Liang and Seungcheol Austin Lee conducted a 
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study using nationally representative data with probability sampling to examine a form of 
sociological fear which they term ‘fear of autonomous robots and artificial intelligence (FARAI)’ 
(2017: p.379). They question ‘the extent and frequency of FARAI and the relationship between 
individuals’ exposure to science fiction and fear toward autonomous robots and artificial 
intelligence’ (2017: p.80). Their analysis revealed that ‘individuals who watch science fiction 
movies were more likely to be afraid of autonomous robots and artificial intelligence’ (2017: 
p.383). Liang and Lee further deduce that ‘increased exposure to science fiction movies and 
media is associated with increased FARAI’ (2017: p.383). These results also carry some 
indirect implications for the ways robots are portrayed in science fiction as they suggest that 
SF films tend to err towards a representation of the robot as dangerous and threatening (2017: 
p.383). Redmond  similarly writes that the robot in SF and SF films has often functioned as a 
‘pathological cyborg [who] is programmed to be relentless in its pursuit of those who champion 
humanity and who stand in their path to greater, technological glory’ (2004: p.156). This form 
of the robot further articulates the fear of technology encroaching in on everyday life. Indeed, 
the British television show Doctor Who (BBC) launched in 1963, features Daleks which were 
extra-terrestrial machines that transformed into violent, merciless killers. The Daleks, driven 
by hatred for the human race, frequently exclaim ‘Exterminate’ as an order for their death and 
eradication. Evidently, this highlights how SF film and television tend to represent the robot as 
‘pathological’ (Redmond, 2004: p.156) and this can stimulate a fear of AI life-forms. 
 
Previous research into robotics and AI in film and fiction has explored the ethics of rights and 
responsibilities towards robotics. Jay Telotte and Barry Grant (2001) study cyberpunk fiction 
– a literature that explores ‘the technological ramifications of experience within late capitalist, 
post-industrial, media-saturated Western society’ (Hollinger, 1990: p.20) – in relation to the 
blurring of science fiction and reality. They use William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) as a 
pioneering example to explore the issue of rights and responsibilities (Telotte and Grant, 2001: 
p.76). Telotte and Grant explain that the protagonist Case sets free an AI from the constraints 
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of its human creators (2001: p.76-77);  they argue that this causes us to question ‘who or what 
is in charge in the new digital world, how we should define life in such an environment and 
how our own sense of self is constructed by the culture we inhabit’ (2001: p.77). By deciphering 
the convergence between nature and technology in the novel and exploring this in relation to 
rights and responsibilities, Telotte and Grant  thus reinforce Garrett Stewart’s  perspective that 
the themes in SF become a ’synecdoche for the entire technics of an imagined society’ 
(Stewart, 1985: p.159). 
 
Hector Gonzalez-Jimanez (2018: p.49) writes that the subject of many of these contemporary 
SF films is a humanoid robot which displays human-like self-awareness and has a mind of its 
own, as in the following movies: I-Robot (Proyas, 2004) and Automata (Ibáñez, 2014). 
Gonzalez-Jimanez  further notes that these movies question whether such developments are 
just science fiction, or whether science will prevail over fiction and humanoid robots who are 
self-aware and autonomous might take active roles in society or even become consumers of 
products and brands (2018: p.49). Similarly, Gunkel explores the actions of HAL 9000 in 2001: 
A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968) in relation to the implications of a self-aware machine. HAL 
9000, an advanced AI, kills a member on the Discovery spacecraft and thus Gunkel argues 
that his actions threaten humans’ safety and as a result of his self-awareness, his actions 
complicate the issue of responsibility (2012: p.18). Gunkel thus questions: ‘when and under 
what circumstances would it truly be correct to say that it was the machine’s fault? What would 
extending agency to machines mean for our understanding of technology, ourselves, and 
ethics?’ (2012: p.18) Evidently, the materialisation of ethical concerns through film and fiction 
highlights the influence science fiction has in shaping technological advancements and 




There is a trend in SF film to present highly stereotyped gendered forms of technology, 
specifically the robot/AI character, where the female is often represented as other and is coded 
by a sexualised depiction. Helen Merrick argues that in SF film, ‘the presence of “Woman” – 
whether actual, threatened or symbolically represented – reflects cultural anxieties about a 
range of “Others” immanent in even the most scientifically pure, technically focused sf’ (2003: 
p.241). Likewise, Brian Attebery argues that ‘the master narrative of science has always been 
told in sexual terms. It represents knowledge, innovation, and even perception as masculine, 
while nature, the passive object of exploration, is described as feminine’ (2000: p.134). 
Researchers Simone Alesich and Michael Rigby are highly critical of this stereotyped narrative 
and argue that ‘female robots and cyborgs in science fiction are often highly sexualised, their 
humanlike bodies accentuated by tight-fitting clothing to reveal their breasts and buttocks’ 
while male robots are depicted as ‘machine-like in appearance with accentuated, stereotypical 
male features such as large muscles and broad shoulders’ (2017: p.55). They examine Her 
by Spike Jonze (2013) and, like Larson (1997), Telotte and Grant (2001) and Bukatman 
(1989), Alesich and Rigby (2017) similarly acknowledge that SF film coincides with 
contemporary technological innovations in robotics. Her is an SF film about a profound, 
emotional man, Theodore, who writes letters by profession and begins to slowly develop 
affection for his operating system. The operating system, Samantha, is not embodied; 
however, it possesses the alluring synthetic voice of a female and through this voice, ‘her’ 
playful, infectious personality is manifested, causing Theodore to fall in love with Samantha. 
Alesich and Rigby (2017) write that the gendered voice of Samantha helps foreground her 
identity and they critique this as an appropriation of stereotypes of females serving others and 
providing assistance. Judith Halberstam (1991) likewise argues that female gendered 
technology is designed to be seductive to encourage more users to engage with it. This is also 
reflected in contemporary society. Indeed, the digital virtual assistants Alexa, Siri and Cortana 
are characterised by a female voice; they therefore reimagine the stereotype of females 
serving others and providing assistance. This highlights how representations of robots in 
science fiction and film matches with cultural depictions of robotics. Andrea Virginás (2017) 
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similarly explores the films S1m0ne (Niccol, 2002), The Congress (Folman, 2013), Her (Jonze, 
2013) and Clouds of Sils Maria (Assayas, 2014) in relation to representations of gendered 
technology. Virginás argues that the films emphasise the inspection of female characters by 
male colleagues, ‘who accompany them throughout their journeys by chance, by force or by 
curiosity, and whose male gaze is contrasted with the spectacle of the “anatomical Venuses” 
they scrutinise’ (2017: p.289). She argues that in these films, the robotic/digital female 
characters are objectified, signalling the trend in SF film to represent highly stereotyped forms 
of gendered technology. This thesis similarly explores gender and sexuality. In the second 
chapter, ‘Gendered Robots in Ex Machina’ explores how the film highlights tensions between 
posthumanity and sexuality and addresses how the film engages with the obsession and 





This thesis will utilise critical posthuman theory, combined with a stylistic close reading of the 
films’ iconography, mise-en-scene and cinematography. This will allow me to explore how 
contemporary science fiction films utilise robotics and AI to undermine and challenge 
anthropocentrism and traditional notions of humanism where the human is marked by its 
superiority, domination and control over non-human others. This approach will enable me to 
draw attention to how SF films project utopic visions of posthumanity, intersubjectivity and 
interconnectedness and to examine the totemic significance of robots.  
 
Posthuman theory offers a challenge to the traditional, anthropocentric concept of western 
humanism, breaking free from Cartesian dualism. It aims to challenge and question the 
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boundaries between the human, the technological and the animal and is critical of the human 
condition as well as traditional humanism and classical versions of humanity. Before delving 
into posthuman theory, it is important to understand humanism and its facets as posthuman 
theory challenges and critiques humanism. The human subject of humanism is traditionally 
categorised by rational thinking and self-regulation and is ‘treated in the singular and as a set 
of features or conditions: rationality, authority, autonomy and agency’ (Nayar, 2013: p.16). 
Morality, ethics and responsibility come from the notion of the autonomous self-determining 
human (Nayar, 2013: p.16). Humanism is the study of this sovereign subject and it treats the 
human as central, universal and monistic. Human exceptionalism and human instrumentalism 
are key facets of humanism. The former is the idea that humans are unique, universal 
creatures and the latter is the notion that humans are superior to the natural world and have 
the right to control it (Nayar, 2013: p.19). Humanism, therefore, distinguishes the human as 
wholly separate from, and thus superior to, non-human life forms.   
 
Posthumanism is the study of cultural representations, power relations and discourses that 
have categorised the human as superior to other life forms and in control of them (Nayar, 
2013: p.13). Posthumanism intersects with other branches of theory as a philosophical, 
cultural and political approach such as, feminism, postcolonialism and ecocriticism, with each 
addressing different notions of posthumanity. Transhumanism and critical posthumanism are 
subsections of posthuman theory; they both question and challenge the human in the era of 
technological modification, hybridised life forms, new discoveries of humanity and the notion 
of life itself (Nayar, 2013: p.13).Transhumanism posits that humans can transcend their bodily 
status through technology to achieve perfectibility and so that faster, more intelligent, longer-
living human bodies may one day exist on Earth (Nayar, 2013: p.16). Cary Wolfe (2010: xv) 
defines transhumanism as ‘an intensification of the human’ while Nick Bostrom, a pioneer in 
the writings of transhumanism, similarly writes that transhumanism allows the human to 
improve through applied science and other rational means, ‘which may make it possible to 
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extend our intellectual and physical capacities and may give us an increased control over our 
own mental states and moods’ (2005: pp.202-203). Transhumanism thus promises the 
possibility of altering one’s identity and becoming changeable. Although it is techno-
deterministic and promotes a greater interface between the human and non-human, 
transhumanism nevertheless upholds the key traits of the human as characterised by 
traditional humanism - sensation, emotion and rationality - and seeks the technological 
enhancement of these qualities (Nayar, 2013: p.18). Thus, traditional ideas of the human are 
reinforced in this form of posthumanism. It is in the critique of the human as innate and 
universal where posthumanism branches out into critical posthumanism. This strand of 
posthumanism radically reworks humanism and aims to divert from the traditional humanist 
notion of the human as autonomous, self-willed and universal (Nayar, 2013: p.13). Critical 
posthumanism advocates symbiosis, interdependence with other life forms and a more ethical 
and inclusive way of life (Nayar, 2013: p.19). It is this approach that I will use in my thesis. 
 
Critical posthumanism constantly draws attention to discourses in which the human functions 
by constructing modes of exclusion and exterminating other life forms (Nayar, 2013: p.46). It 
therefore refutes traditional ideals of human exceptionalism and human instrumentalism in its 
vision of a post-human future. Critical posthumanism engenders the human as a congeries, 
as co-evolving and co-existing with other life forms, and in this way of thinking technology is 
deemed ‘integral’ to human identity rather than a prosthesis to it (Nayar, 2013: p.19). Rosi 
Braidotti, a leading philosopher in posthuman theory, writes that posthumanism is marked by 
a ‘post-anthropocentric turn’ (2013: p.57) which is a shift from monism and sovereignty to 
alternative modes of inclusivity. She defines the Anthropocene as ‘the historical moment when 
the human has become a geological force capable of affecting all life on this planet’ and further 
notes that the Anthropocene ‘can also help us rethink our interaction with both human and 




Post-anthropocentrism is marked by the emergence of ‘the politics of life itself’. 
‘Life’, far from being codified as the exclusive property or the unalienable right of 
one species, the human, over all others or of being sacralised as a pre-established 
given, is posited as process, interactive and open-ended (2013: p.60). 
This utopian approach displaces boundaries that were traditionally reserved for the human, 
the animal and non-human (Braidotti, 2013: p.60) and therefore abolishes normative 
subjectivity, in replacement for co-evolving, ‘species blurring and species mixing’ (Nayar, 
2013: p.19). Patricia MacCormack similarly writes that: 
Posthuman ethics sees the dividuation of life in opposition to identity, as it 
acknowledges the inevitable connection between living bodies as the point of 
ethical address and, in a seeming postmodern conundrum, the individual is 
constituted only by its connection to other individuals (2016: p.4).  
MacCormack furthermore elaborates that there is ‘no body without mind, no individuality 
without connection, no affect without expression, will as appetite beyond consciousness and, 
perhaps most importantly, no thought or theory without materiality’ (2016: p.4). This reinforces 
Nayar and Braidotti’s view of the human as a congeries and a subject that is embodied and 
embedded in a heteronomous environment. Braidotti additionally writes that the shift to post-
anthropocentrism can be seen as deconstructive as it disintegrates ‘species supremacy, but 
it also inflicts a blow to any lingering notion of human nature, Anthropos and bios, as 
categorically distinct from the life of animals and non-humans’ (2013: p.65). Citing Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Braidotti writes that this form of critical posthumanism thus 
engenders a ‘nature-culture continuum’ and this shift can be seen as an ‘anthropological 
exodus’ from the dominant configurations of the human as the king of creation (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: p.215 in Braidotti, 2013: p.65).  Thus, the undermining of the anthropos’ centrality 
results in ‘empowering the sexualised and racialised human [and non-human] ‘others’ [and 
enables them] to emancipate themselves from the dialectics of master-slave relations’ 




The holistic, all-encompassing view of the human as a congeries is further emphasised by 
Donna Haraway’s techno-utopian view that ‘machine / organism relationships are obsolete 
and unnecessary’ (1991: p.178). For Haraway, the cyborg is neither human nor machine; it is 
a hybrid, a liminal creature and thus she renders relationships between the two as obsolete 
(1991: p.178). This indicates a shift in the human-machine relationship as Haraway’s version 
of the cyborg suggests that humans are transforming into cyborgs by assimilating with 
technology and machines are simultaneously becoming cyborg through their ability to look 
human-like and enact humanity. The cyborg thus exists in a state of fluidity and hybridity.  
Haraway further questions: ‘why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other 
beings encapsulated by skin?’ and concludes ‘we don't need organic holism to give 
impermeable whole-ness’ (1991: p.178) echoing Nayar and Braidotti’s version of critical 
posthumanism as an inclusive, non-unitary approach. Similarly, Wolfe’s version of 
posthumanism corresponds with the likes of Nayar and Haraway. Wolfe argues that her 
version of posthumanism comes both before and after humanism. She explains that:  
It comes before in the sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of 
the human being in not just its biological but also its technological world, the 
prosthetic coevolution of the human animal with the external archival mechanisms 
(such as language and culture)…But it comes after in the sense that 
posthumanism names a historical moment in which the decentering of the human 
by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks is 
increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points toward the 
necessity of new theoretical paradigms, a new mode of thought that comes after 
the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions, 
of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon (2009: xv-xvi). 
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Therefore, Wolfe, like other critical posthumanists, rejects human exceptionality by 
destabilising the binaries of the natural and artificial that humanism seeks to distinguish as 
separate by suggesting that both human and technological worlds have coevolved. The 
historical perspective is important as it suggests that humanism itself then becomes ‘a 
historically specific phenomenon’ (Wolfe, 2009: xv-xvi).  
 
The films chosen for this thesis thus critique the anthropic principle and the representation of 
the robot in these films questions the borders and boundaries of identity creation and 
destabilises the human condition. Critical posthumanism is crucial in exploring how the 
representation of the robot challenges structures of exclusion. This thesis will thus use critical 
posthumanism to explore how these films establish a posthumanity through creating a 
symbiosis and convergence between humans and robots. 
  
Overview of chapters 
 
The first chapter, ‘Empathy and Otherness in A.I Artificial Intelligence’, explores A.I Artificial 
Intelligence and examines humans’ displacement of responsibility towards robots through 
Monica’s abandonment of her robot child, David. This chapter argues that her abandonment 
problematises the human and non-human binary and blurs the boundary between the two. I 
further argue that the film critiques humanity and the classical, humanist version of man by 
cinematically evoking a history of racialised, marginalised others, wherein the human functions 
by establishing modes of domination and superiority. The second chapter, ‘Gendered Robots 
in Ex Machina’, explores posthuman embodiment and intersubjectivity in Ex Machina, 
engaging in critical posthumanist debates on coexistence and coevolution. This chapter also 
explores the tension between a humanoid robot, and the gender and patriarchy imposed upon 
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her, which complicates the promise of an interconnected, posthuman subject. The third 
chapter, ‘Care and Relationality in Robot and Frank’, considers the ethical implications of 
posthuman care in Robot and Frank. This chapter explores how the film depicts a growing 
interdependence between Robot and Frank where they are heteronomous, embedded 
subjects. This chapter analyses how this growing interdependence challenges human 
exceptionalism and human instrumentalism and causes us to rethink human subjectivity.  
 
Overall, the purpose of this study is to explore how the representation of the robot in the above 
films questions and destabilises the binaries of human and machine, natural and artificial, 
organic and inorganic and to bring to the fore that identity formation is not reserved solely for 
the human. Through a critical posthuman lens, this thesis aims to offer a fresh viewpoint on 
the representation of robotics and AI in SF film and to elucidate that the robot does not always 
signify threat and jeopardy. While the thesis certainly addresses how the films gauge anxieties 
and concerns about the future of robots, this thesis argues that the representation of the robot 
in these films displaces cultural boundaries of the human as universal and exclusive and offers 
a more inclusive, greater notion of interconnectedness and intersubjectivity. After all, robotics 
and AI are becoming increasingly predominant in society and this calls for a greater interface 













This chapter explores Steven Spielberg’s (2001) science fiction film A.I. Artificial Intelligence, 
which is based on the short story ‘Supertoys Last All Summer Long’ by Brian Aldiss (1969). 
A.I Artificial Intelligence is set in a post-climate change, futuristic society, where pregnancies 
are licensed via legal sanctions and robots, who do not require food or material resources, are 
a vital link in the chainmail of society (0:01:41). The robots in the film are known as mechas 
and they are humanoid robots who look and act very human and are capable of complex 
thought. They are designed for specific roles such as, a nanny robot, a child robot, a sex robot, 
a comedian robot etc. The film focuses on the character David (played by Haley Joel Osment) 
- a prototype mecha child programmed with the ability to love. It follows David’s journey to 
become a ‘real live boy’, which is inspired by his faith and belief in the fairy tale Pinnochio 
(Collodi, 1995), after he has been abandoned by his adoptive mother Monica Swinton (played 
by Frances O’Connor).  David and the other mechas he encounters become victims of the 
Flesh Fair - a fair known as the ‘celebration of life’ where mecha are destroyed. This chapter 
thus explores how the film problematises issues of rights and responsibilities through the 
inhumane actions of the human characters.  
 
 
A.I Artificial Intelligence was originally the work of Stanley Kubrick, director of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (1968), who purchased the rights to Aldiss’ story during the 1970s. However, inspired 
by Spielberg’s (1993) Jurassic Park with its revolutionary CGI effects, Kubrick handed the 
rights to Spielberg in 1995 and film production began after Kubrick’s death in 1999. James 
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Naremore (2005) writes that ‘Kubrick is therefore figured as the ghost in the machine and 
Spielberg as his eulogist’. The film has thus received various critical responses as critics 
explore the Kubrickian and Spielbergian themes and the hybridisation of their contradistinctive 
cinematic styles. Naremore (2005), who received the film positively, comments on the 
differences in style: while ‘Kubrick was a fastidious stylist who favoured slow, sometimes over-
the-top performances and crystal-clear imagery, Spielberg is a flashy rhetorician who works 
with dazzling speed [and] produces fast-paced narratives with a garish look’. Other critics have 
not been so complimentary on the combination of Kubrick and Spielberg’s work. Indeed, 
Leonard Maltin (2014) attests that ‘the result is a curious and uncomfortable hybrid of Kubrick 
and Spielberg sensibilities.’ Similarly, Mick LaSalle (2001) denigrates the film as ‘exhibit[ing] 
all its creators' bad traits and none of the good. So, we end up with the structureless, slow-
motion endlessness of Kubrick combined with the fuzzy, mindlessness of Spielberg’. Despite 
the varied critical responses, the film received multiple nominations and awards such as, the 
Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy and Horror Films, USA Saturn award in 2002, the BMI 
Film and TV award in 2002 and the World Soundtrack award in 2001. 
 
 
A.I Artificial Intelligence encourages the audience to feel with the non-human other and 
adversely, see the human as less human than the robot.  By attributing a greater level of 
humanity to the robot, the film forces us to confront and challenge traditional humanist notions 
of human subjectivity, universality, and exceptionality. I further argue that while the film 
certainly produces posthuman visions of the robot as an empathetic, human being, it also 
explores and provokes our discomfort in its representation of the robots, causing us to reflect 
on the nature of humanity. This chapter further analyses how the film establishes an 
‘ontological liminality’ (Cohen, 1996: p.6). Nayar  explains that ontological liminality is what 
characterises life forms that are between categories, such as the creature in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein (1823) and the character of Mr Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson’s (1886) The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde (Nayar, 2013: p.114). He argues that ‘life forms and 
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bodies too uncomfortably close - such as humanoid robots or creatures that exhibit human 
emotions and/or intelligence - are equally monstrous in cultural representations of otherness’ 
(2013: p.115). Nayar elucidates that forms and ways of human life considered different and 
unconventional get categorised as ‘monstrous’ and that this concept of the monster 
establishes modes of exclusion and difference (2013: p.115). Thus, I argue that A.I. Artificial 
Intelligence explores ‘ontological liminality’ through the humans’ treatment of the robot as other 
which enables us to question what the boundaries are between human and non-human. The 
depiction of the mecha as figures of ‘ontological liminality’ forces us to challenge and question 
the structures of exclusion that enable the human to position him/herself as dominant and 
superior.  
   
 
Analysis of A.I. Artificial Intelligence 
 
 
A.I. Artificial Intelligence explores humanity’s capacity, or more appropriately, incapacity for 
responsibility, which is articulated through the inhumane treatment of the humanoid robot. The 
analysis will explore how the film draws attention to the blurring of the human and the non-
human and uses the humanoid robot to emphasise otherness more broadly.  
 
 
The film exploits the meaning of the maternal bond and the cultural understanding of this bond 
in order to make acute the critique of human irresponsibility when Monica abandons David. 2 
The maternal bond is first established when Monica activates David’s imprinting protocol. As 
 
2  David is given as a gift to Henry Swinton (Sam Robards) and his wife Monica from the company he 
works for - Cybertronics (a company which sells commercial humanoid robots). His purpose is to be 
all-loving and fill the childless void the Swintons feel as their biological son Martin (played by Jake 
Thomas) lies cryogenically frozen in a coma. Later in the film, Martin returns after making an 




David is programmed with the ability to love unconditionally, to experience this, the user must 
recite a string of specific words to activate his programming. After Monica recites the words, 
David automatically responds: ‘what were those words for, Mommy?’ marking a transition from 
calling her ‘Monica’ to ‘Mommy’ (0:21:34 - 0:23:51). Although the term ‘Mommy’ is obviously 
an automated response of his programming, it nevertheless signifies trust, safety and security 
and foregrounds the maternal relationship between David and Monica. James Kendrick 
similarly writes that the imprinting scene ‘is one of the most touching in all of Spielberg’s films’ 
(2014: p.181). We therefore judge Monica harshly for her callous actions when she chooses 
to abandon David. During the time that David is a part of Monica and Henry’s lives, a series 
of incidents occur and the Swintons misinterpret these as David’s doing. For example, at a 
pool party for their biological son, Martin, David is approached by Martin’s friends who 
physically threaten David with a knife. David holds onto Martin and in walking backwards, 
away from the situation, he and Martin end up falling into the pool. Monica and Henry 
misinterpret this incident as an act of violence and decide to take David back to Cybertronics 
for destruction in order to protect their biological son. However, unable to live with the idea 
that David will be destroyed, Monica chooses to abandon David.   The abandonment scene 
begins with Monica and David driving through a forest road (0:48:04) with David asking Monica 
a series of questions: ‘where are we going? Someplace nice? Are those happy tears?’ She 
struggles to respond as she contemplates the immorality of her action. The mise-en-scene 
cinematically establishes dissonance for the viewers as the forest becomes a signifier of 
danger and disequilibrium, disrupting the previous diegesis of familial bliss and maternal love. 
When Monica confesses to David that she is leaving him, the camera cuts into a close up of 
David (0:50:29), constructed in a shot-reverse-shot, and lingers on David for a few seconds to 
show his look of disbelief as he processes the trauma at being separated from his mother. 
David generates an empathetic response as the image of an innocent, vulnerable child 
begging and exclaiming, ‘no, Mommy, please no’ renders him as human as it signifies his 
dependency on his mother. The choice of casting furthermore reflects David’s vulnerability 
and innocence: Osment’s bauble-like blue eyes, softened, youthful features and hopeful 
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expression indeed reflect the quintessential image of an innocent child. Moreover, as David’s 
tone of voice is non-robotic and very much like a human child, it reinforces his human-like 
nature. Monica’s desertion of David appears more perverse, then, as she does not just 
abandon a robot, but a robot-child who embodies and enacts a humanity so convincing that 
we feel for David and not Monica. Through this, the film draws attention to humanity’s selfish 
nature as Monica ultimately prioritises the safety of her real, flesh and blood son over her 
mechanical, artificial one. The film further highlights her selfish nature as her decision to desert 
David rather than take him back to Cybertronics where he would have been destroyed, allows 
her to shift feelings of guilt and to feel as though she did not assist in his destruction. Through 
the exploitation of the maternal bond and the idea that the mother should be all-loving and 
self-sacrificing, the film critiques humanity’s irresponsible, narcissistic nature. 
 
 
As outlined above, David embodies the figure of the human child. To be human thus means 
to have rights and responsibilities and this notion further problematises the boundaries 
between the human and the technological. The dialogue between David and Monica in the 
abandonment scene reflects this as it invites greater sympathy for David as if he is a 
vulnerable, human child:  
David: Mommy, if Pinocchio became a real boy and I become a real boy, can I 
come home? Why do you want to leave me?  
Monica: Stories are not real! You’re not real! 
David: I’m sorry I’m not real. If you let me, I’ll be so real for you! (0:50:00 - 0:51:49) 
Monica’s wounding reminder of David’s artificiality combined with David’s vulnerability and 
affirmative belief in fairy tale generates empathy, as his motivation, Pinocchio, symbolises 
hope and faith – fundamental traits of humanity. David subsequently exhibits feelings of loss 
and grief whilst Monica shows a lack of empathy, highlighting how the film destabilises the 
binary between human and non-human. The combination of the diegetic sounds of David’s 
voice breaking as he cries and the poignant, music draws more attention to the severity of 
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Monica’s deed. Indeed, her action is an enactment of separation anxiety, a primal fear of the 
child and a prominent fairy tale trope as can be seen in the tales of Hansel and Gretel (1812) 
and Cinderella (1950). Bruno Bettelheim, author of The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning 
and Importance of Fairy Tales (1976), writes: 
There is no greater threat in life than that we will be deserted, left all alone. 
Psychoanalysis has named this—man’s greatest fear—separation anxiety and the 
younger we are, the more excruciating is our anxiety when we feel deserted, for 
the young child actually perishes when not adequately protected and taken care 
of (Bettleheim, 1976: p.23 in Kendrick, 2014: p.198). 
Evidently, as the conditions of imprinting maintain that David’s love for Monica would be sealed 
and hardwired into his AI, Monica’s desertion of David traps him in an eternal, irrevocable 
bond, unable to transcend his emotions and feelings and to love another. This therefore 
signifies a ‘cruel, arbitrary dependency imposed upon him through human fault’ (Otsuki and 
Greydanus, 2001) and this dependency causes David to deteriorate emotionally and ‘perish’ 
(Bettleheim, 1976) due to the lack of reciprocal love. The emotional tenor of David’s desertion 
makes it difficult for the viewers to watch as Monica traumatises David by skewering the idea 
of maternal love. By rendering David as a creature that one can identify and empathise with, 
A.I Artificial Intelligence thus effectively questions: who or what can be considered human? 
The film critiques humans’ egoistic nature through causing the audience to dissociate with the 
humans in the film and question their own humanity. In turn, this question threatens human 
subjectivity as the implication that a robot is more human undermines the idea of the human 
as central and universal. 
 
 
The analysis has so far shown that David embodies and enacts a humanity that is so 
convincing and realistic that we empathise and sympathise with him as if he were human. 
Although we are aware that he is a humanoid robot, it is easy to forget this fact as the film 
consistently portrays him as human through his ability to exhibit human emotions and through 
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his embodiment which represents the very image of the human child. David’s quest to find the 
Blue Fairy, a fictional character in Carlo Collodi’s The Adventures of Pinocchio (1883), who 
he believes will make him a ‘real live boy’, results in him meeting his creator, Professor Hobby 
at the Cybertronics headquarters. There, David discovers multiple copies of himself, packaged 
and ready to be shipped and commercialised. This scene not only reminds David of his 
artificiality, but it also reminds the viewers. I therefore argue that although the film presents 
David as human and asks ‘posthuman’ questions such as who or what can be regarded 
human, at the same time, the film explores the anxiety we feel at this representation of David. 
This scene causes us to question the nature of humanity, but not in the same way that the 
abandonment scene does. This scene thus undermines the idea that David is human and 
expresses a tension between his humanity and inhumanity. 
 
 
In this scene, David is forced to confront his non-unitary nature as he meets his replica, and 
this similarly forces us to comprehend that he is not human. By reminding us of his artificiality, 
the film draws attention to how we have been emotionally invested in a non-human, non-living, 
non-breathing character. This in turn reminds us that he is just a robot and not a child. The 
scene begins with David entering Professor Hobby’s study, calling his name in a bid to find 
the Blue Fairy. The soft focus and ambient lighting combined with the mellow music of this 
scene is cognisant of a fairy tale and offers the possibility of hope (1:38:55). The domestic 
ambiance is dramatically cut short when David’s question ‘is this the place they make you 
real?’ is returned with a response from his duplicate, in an ironic twist of fate (1:39:01). The 
music, which becomes tense and foreboding, increasingly crescendos as the camera cuts into 
a close up of David whose face registers shock and trauma as he questions: ‘are you real? 
are you me?’ The clone responds ‘I’m David’ to which, David refuses: ‘you’re not…so am I’ 
exhibiting signs of the Uncanny Valley. This is a term coined by Japanese roboticist Masahiro 
Mori in 1970 and it maintains that humanoid objects or creatures that resemble human beings 
trigger a feeling of uncanniness and strange familiarity, causing the human observer to fall 
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into a metaphorical valley of uneasiness. While David is not a human it can nevertheless be 
argued that he experiences The Uncanny Valley as the sight of his clone causes him to react 
negatively. After the clone benignly proposes a friendship between the two, the camera cuts 
into a close up of David at 1:39:58 whose expression transforms into malice as he lowers his 
head, akin to that of a predator about to attack its prey, and whispers in a sinister tone ‘You 
can’t have her [Monica] …She’s mine and I’m the only one’. Immediately after, David picks up 
a large lamp and begins violently swinging it, attacking the other David and decapitating his 
head as he repeatedly cries out ‘I’m special! I’m unique! You can’t have her!’ (1:40:13). Here, 
David’s regression is analogous to biblical stories of sibling rivalries, such as the rivalry 
between Cain and Abel and Jacob and Esau. In both instances, the dispute stemmed from 
determining ‘who is the true or firstborn son, who has the primacy, the primogeniture’ 
(Greydanus and Otsuki, 2002). Thus, David sees his clone as a false brother and his 
declaration, ‘I’m David!’ is not simply an affirmation of his subjectivity; it highlights the 
uncanniness and surrealism he experiences, forcing him to confront his artificiality. This in turn 
forces the audience to come to terms with the fact that David is not a human, more specifically, 
he is not a child, despite his human child-like embodiment and the human emotions he 
displays.  As we previously identified with David as human, this scene may therefore call for 
the reconsideration of the ontological boundaries that dictate who or what is human. 
 
 
This scene further deconstructs David’s subjectivity through the dark depiction of the David 
replicas which causes us to further question whether he is human. There is evidently a tension 
here as the film previously depicts him as human and thus, we struggle with the two competing 
ideas and experience our own sense of the uncanny as our expectations of what is human 
and what is not are destabilised. In this scene, Professor Hobby explains to David that he is 
just an experiment and modelled on his son and David responds, ‘I thought I was one of a 
kind…my brain is falling out’ as he struggles to comprehend his non-universality (1:42:40). 
After Professor Hobby exits, David detours further into his office where he discovers the 
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clones. A tracking shot follows David and is accompanied by eerie, choral non-diegetic sounds 
which sound almost spirit and ghost like (1:44:04). This shot transitions into a low angle shot 
of David making him appear larger which ironically works to maximise his insignificance, as 
the low angle shot enhances the uncanny expression on his face (1:44:21). The camera cuts 
into a close up shot of a shadowed body stood sideways with the same facial affects as David 
and as the camera pans to the left, it reveals a row of David mecha dolls, dressed in white and 
hanging like meat in a slaughterhouse, establishing dissonance and undermining David’s 
exclusivity (1:44:24 - 1:44:36). As David walks through what can be interpreted as a literal 
Uncanny Valley, the camera switches from a long, wide angle shot to a tracking shot, utilising 
eyeline matching to visually estrange the audience as David not only sees the clones, but also 
an array of dismembered body parts, faces in the form of masks, scalpels and X-rays of the 
human body and mecha clone. Evidently, this sequence is not only an abject confrontation for 
David with the notion of his artificiality, but a threat to his sovereignty as ‘the only one’. 
Likewise, this causes the audience to experience a sense of the uncanny as our previous 
perception of David as human is further derailed through the David copies.  David sees rows 
of boxes entitled David and a female prototype entitled Darlene with the label: ‘at last – a love 
of your own’ ready to be shipped and sold.  One of the boxes shakes, causing him to fearfully 
return to the central space of the room and the camera subsequently executes a dolly zoom 
into David’s traumatised, pained face (1:45:42 - 1:46:46). Perhaps the most cinematically 
cutting technique, the dolly shot captures the background (the mechas hanging, spare body 
parts and boxed mechas) while expanding and zooming in on the subject, David, to create an 
optical illusion that is unsettling and disorienting. Thus, this shot combined with the intonating, 
climactic music dissociates the audience from the idea that David is a human subject. The film 
depicts the tension between David’s humanity and inhumanity as threatening the boundary 
between the human and non-human; it forces us to dwell on what makes anyone human and 
how these things are similarly affected by the commercialised and capitalist world we live in. 
In addition, the idea of trying to become a ‘real boy’ comes under scrutiny here – seeing David 
in this place makes us question: how far is the idea of becoming a ‘real live boy’ a fairy tale? 
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It is a fairy tale that depends upon a traditional humanist idea of a subject, a boy, an original, 
and not a copy. In interrogating the limits of the fairy tale, this scene further draws attention to 
the difficulties of being, or being identified and recognised as, human. 
  
 
As outlined above, the film presents a tension between the robot and human boundary by 
reinforcing David’s artificiality. A.I. Artificial Intelligence thus emphasises the ‘difference’ of 
robots by adopting a narrative of otherness and alienation through visually and cinematically 
re-envisioning a disturbing history of racialisation, colonisation and marginalisation. This is 
seen through the abhorrent, technophobic debauchery that is the Flesh Fair. During this 
sequence, David and other rogue mechas are captured and theatrically staged on display for 
nefarious forms of destruction before a depraved crowd. One of the most pivotal sequences 
in the film, the Flesh Fair marks the midpoint of the movie and is advertised as the ‘Celebration 
of Life’ – a crude and ironic sentiment which demarcates the boundaries between man and 
machine by demonstrating human superiority and domination through the sadistic attempts to 
‘sanitise and dispose of the other’ (Nayar, 2013: p.110). This scene therefore uses the 
humanoid robot to articulate otherness and remind the viewer of histories of oppression. 
 
 
The mise-en-scene and cinematography in the scene leading up to the Flesh Fair re-envision 
one of the most disturbing iterations of oppression and dehumanisation - Slavery and Master-
Slave relationships. This emphasises the inhumanity of the humans and the mechas’ 
‘ontological liminality’ (Cohen, 1996: p.6). Prior to the Flesh Fair, a vehicle resembling a 
garbage truck stops at the edge of the forest where David and Teddy  - an AI operated teddy-
bear known as a Supertoy - have been walking and deposits a load of antiquated, 
dismembered artificial body parts such as arms, faces, legs and, eyes, all of which, piled 
together, visually resemble skeletal corpses after incineration (0:58:58 -  0:59:11). The items 
attract a motley crew of mecha who appear from the forest and begin rummaging for newer 
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parts to attach to themselves in anticipation of the Flesh Fair (0:59:37).  They do this to conceal 
their outdated artificiality and to look more human and to therefore avoid being captured and 
tortured. During this sequence, an African American mecha attaches a white arm to his body 
and this promulgates racial connotations to White Supremacy (0:59:59). As he attempts to 
attach a brown mechanical forearm, the wires repel this juncture, akin to the resistance 
between two like forces due to incompatibility. The mecha then attaches a white mechanical 
forearm which connects perfectly. This is framed within a medium shot (1:00:00) which zooms 
into a close up, focusing in on the physiognomy of the white and brown surfaces. After the 
arm is conjoined, a tracking shot displays the mecha raising his new arm as he gazes at it in 
admiration. This image re-enacts a history of marginalisation and oppression. On the notion 
of otherness and marginalisation, Braidotti writes that the humanist man is ‘simultaneously an 
abstract universal and very much the spokesman of an elite species: both Human and 
Anthropos’ (2013: p.67). All other forms of embodiment are removed from the subject position; 
they include anthropomorphic others - non-white, non-masculine, disabled, malformed or 
enhanced peoples and humanoids (Braidotti, 2013: p.68). She further elaborates:  
All these ‘others’ are rendered as pejoration, pathologized and cast out of 
normality, on the side of anomaly, deviance, monstrosity and bestiality. This 
process is inherently anthropocentric, gendered and racialized in that it upholds 
aesthetic and moral ideals based on white, masculine, heterosexual European 
civilization (2013: p.68). 
Thus, the implication that the white mechanical arm provides protection and makes the African 
American more compatible is reminiscent of master-slave relationships; it visually recreates 
the African American slave’s dependence upon their White Master and therefore draws 
attention to the way life forms that are deemed less-human/inhuman are othered. 
 
 
The abuse of the mechas, which is so heavily reinforced, is an act of repeated violence and 
thus emphasises the mechas’ ‘ontological liminality’. As earlier established, this idea posits 
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that the non-human/those deemed less human are ‘different’ and get ‘subsumed into the 
category ‘monstrous’ [as] the very idea of the monster allows the construction of difference’ 
(Nayar, 2013: p.115). The idea of difference therefore suggests that ‘humanity survives by 
constructing modes of exclusion, and the monster's ontological liminality enables domination, 
persecution, incarceration/containment, exhibition/display, genocide, displacement and 
elimination of certain forms of life’ (Nayar, p.116). This is indeed represented in the Flesh Fair 
through genocidal imagery which evokes one of the most horrific crimes against humans – the 
Holocaust and the extermination of Jews. As Lord Johnson-Johnson, the ringleader of the 
Flesh Fair, drags David on stage to be tortured, the film employs a tracking shot of an 
incinerated, emaciated, skeletal mecha corpse being dragged against the sand, akin to a 
victim of a Nazi concentration camp (1:14:44). This shot is matched with a parallel shot of 
David who is also being dragged across the floor as the camera adjacently pans around him, 
cinematically presaging David’s fate as similar to that of the corpse (1:14:48). The diegesis of 
this sequence unsettles the viewer as the tumultuous chants for ‘Johnson’ as he reels the 
victims into the arena cinematically depict him as Hitler, about to implement the Final Solution. 
The mechas’ ‘ontological liminality’ (Cohen, 1996: p.6), then, enables the extermination of their 
lives and ‘the reduction to sub-human status of others is [therefore] a source of ignorance and 
bad consciousness for the dominant subject, [the human], who is responsible for their 
epistemic as well as social de-humanization’ (Braidotti, 2013: p.28). Thus, the depiction of the 
mecha as ‘monstrous’ enables the humans in the film to ‘survive by constructing modes of 
exclusion’ (Nayar, 2013: p.116). Through this, A.I. Artificial Intelligence critiques the 
boundaries humans demarcate - man vs. machine, man vs. animal, white vs. black, etc, and 
therefore alludes to humanity’s lack of responsibility for anything it deems inferior or ‘non-
human’ by exploiting historical tragedies, such as the Holocaust and Slavery.  
 
Nayar (2013: p.132) writes that another form in which humans distinguish clear boundaries 
between the human and non-human is through cultural representations of Speciesism. He 
writes that ‘speciesism positions the human as the dominant species that then controls, 
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domesticates, oppresses, exploits, guards and pets non-human species.’ (Nayar, 2013: 
p.132). Evidently, Johnson’s anti-mecha rhetoric reflects speciesism as he shouts: ‘any old 
iron? Expel your mecha. Purge yourselves of artificiality’ when surveying the forest for antique 
mechas (1:01:36). His hateful rhetoric positions him and thus the humans in the film as the 
dominant species as it signifies ‘agnatology’; this is a phenomenon outlined by Paul Gilroy 
(2000) and it refers to enforced and structural ignorance towards others (Braidotti, 2013: p.28). 
Braidotti elaborates: ‘Dialectical and pejorative otherness induces structural ignorance about 
those who, by being others, are posited as the outside of major categorical divides in the 
attribution of humanity’ (2013: p.28). Evidently, Johnson’s cultural reference to the scrap-man 
announcement (‘any old iron’) highlights an ‘enforced ignorance’ (Braidotti, 2013: p.28) as it 
promotes the disposability of mechas, which in turn promotes the anthropocentric notion of 
humans as the superior, universal species (Nayar, 2013). A.I Artificial Intelligence exploits the 
relationship between the human and the robot to ask the questions: how should humans treat 
others? What responsibilities do humans have towards each other and towards non-humans? 
These questions draw attention to speciesism in which the human subject is controlling and 
oppressive and therefore critique the anthropic principle - the idea that the universe is tuned 
to humans and human existence only (Pepperell, 2003: iii). 
  
 
While the film consistently delivers a critique of humanity’s treatment of others and 
irresponsibility towards non-human others, the ending complicates this critique; by offering a 
contradictory happy ever after in a film where fairy tales offer empty promises, this ending 
takes away from the darkness of the film. A time jump to 2,000 years into the future reveals 
futuristic machine entities who have evolved beyond humans. These descendants of robots 
and mechas populate a planet in which climate change has taken effect as it is covered in ice. 
Human beings are extinct, and the world inhabited by the ‘SuperMechas’ as Kendrick (2014) 
terms them, is void of capitalism, gender, race and nationality. The SuperMechas who 
discover and revive David’s memories, portray an interest in human history and bring Monica 
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back to life for 24 hours through their advanced technology, enabling David to reunite with the 
source of his affection.  
  
 
The central critique of the film has been directed towards humans’ othering and mistreatment 
of human others and non-humans and the structures of exclusion which have positioned the 
human as superior. Ironically, the last portion of the film appears to propagate the very ideals 
of Humanism that it denigrates. Indeed, the conversation between David and the SuperMecha 
depicts the human as a creature to be revered:  
David, I often felt a sort of envy of human beings and that thing they call 'spirit'. 
Human beings had created a million explanations of the meaning of life in art, in 
poetry, in mathematical formulas. Certainly, human beings must be the key to the 
meaning of existence, but human beings no longer existed…David, you are the 
enduring memory of the human race, the most lasting proof of their genius (2:08:15 
- 2:10:30).  
Evidently, terms like ‘genius’ and ‘spirit’ and the idea that human beings define existence 
represents humanistic idealism, and, ironically, this promotes the liberal individualistic view of 
the subject as perfect in terms of autonomy, rationality and self-determination (Braidotti, 2013: 
p.23). The Supermechas’ claim that David is the memory of the human race is indeed ironic 
as David is not human as we have been reminded of throughout the film. This ‘nostalgia for 
human idealism’ (Naremore, 2005) threatens to undermine the critique of humanistic ideals 
and anthropocentrism. The SuperMecha furthermore informs David that they (the 
SuperMechas) attempted to bring back humans, highlighting an idolisation of the human race. 
And yet, even in this reverence of humanism, the film manages to subtly critique the idea of 
the human as universal and subjective. The temporal shift into the future where humans are 
extinct and the planet is engulfed in ice is an overt, yet predictable, iteration of the destructive 
nature of humanity. The most conspicuous and flagrant threat to the idealistic humanist 
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version of man is the evolution of Artificial Intelligence, evidenced by the SuperMechas which 
actualise and materialise the ‘Technological Singularity’ (Vinge, 1993). This is the concept that 
Artificial Intelligence will surpass human intelligence and change the course of evolution by 
demoting humans to the status of secondary intelligent creatures whilst Artificial Intelligent 
entities will be the primary, superior forces at the centre of the universe (this will be explored 
in more detail in the following chapter). Thus, while the ending maintains its critique of the 
human as dominant and superior through the nostalgia of human idealism, at the same time, 
in a more dissonant tone, it idealises humanity and venerates human beings as exceptional, 
presenting a conflicted and somewhat problematic conclusion to an otherwise consistent 
critique of humans’ inhumanity.  
 
 
The ambiguity of the film’s ending has been received harshly by critics as ‘problematic’ and 
as ‘the ultimate Spielbergian cop-out, a laboured attempt to somehow graft a sentimental 
happy ending onto an otherwise dark and complicated film’ (Kendrick, 2014: p.204). Evidently, 
after a turbulent journey to becoming a ‘real live boy’ and seeking requited love, the film 
concludes with David achieving the ‘everlasting moment he had been waiting for’ (2:17:09) 
when Monica informs him she has always loved him and David thus joins her in sleep. This 
final shot has received much criticism for its ambiguity; Kendrick  notes that David’s ‘going to 
sleep’ may symbolise death given that the film earlier states that David cannot sleep (2014: 
p.208); however, there is also the suggestion that should David awake, he will once again be 
left alone, with no possibility of another to reciprocate his love (Kendrick, 2014: p.208). 
Similarly, Tim Kreider (2002) writes that while the ending alludes to the childish dream of 
reunion, it is nevertheless bleak and desolate, trapping David in an eternity of longing for a 
dead mother (Kreider, 2002: p.34 in Kendrick, 2014: p.208). Evidently, David is once again 
left to deteriorate and perish emotionally as a result of his hardwiring, further extending the 
critique of humanity as irresponsible and reactionary through their development of a machine 
stuck in an all-loving freeze-frame. The somewhat contradictory ending complicates the 
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critique it delivers, as while there is a happily ever after, the idea that David is left alone is a 
further critique of a cruel and inhumane system and this therefore maintains the dark tone of 





Through a macabre re-envisioning of a history of racialised, marginalised others and an 
exploitation of responsibility and accountability, A.I Artificial Intelligence critiques humanity’s 
treatment of those deemed less human/non-human. By conducting a close reading of the film’s 
mise-en-scene and cinematography, this chapter argues that the film uses the non-human to 
explore otherness more broadly and draws attention to the mechas’ ‘ontological liminality’ 
(Cohen, 1996: p.6) as the Flesh Fair scene attests. This chapter extends this argument to 
ascertain that through the ostracization of the mecha as the other, the humans in the film 
establish structures of difference and domination - an attribute of humanist and 
anthropocentric notions of human superiority and universality. This chapter argues that 
through this, A.I. Artificial Intelligence dissociates the audience from the humans in the film by 
causing them to question the demarcations and boundaries between man and machine. The 
film furthermore exploits the image of the ‘human’ child to invite empathy and question: who 
is human? what responsibilities does the human hold towards the non-human? This is made 
clearer in the scene where David sees the other mecha dolls as it forces the audience to 
witness David’s artificiality and therefore reminds us that he is not human. Thus, while the film 
indeed engenders posthuman visions of an empathetic, ‘human’ robot, at the same time, it 
makes us feel uncomfortable in its representation of the robot which causes us to rethink what 
it means to be human. While the ending complicates the critique of humanity, it does not 
completely undo this. The critique is still subtly maintained through the temporality of the film.  
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The futuristic time jump, in which humanity is extinct and advanced AI species dominate the 



















Gendered Robots in Ex Machina 
 
Introduction  
   
This chapter analyses Alex Garland’s award-winning psychological science-fiction film Ex 
Machina (2015) in relation to intersubjectivity, posthuman embodiment, gender and sexuality. 
Ex Machina follows the journey of a young programmer, Caleb (played by Domhnall Gleeson), 
who has been selected as the human component in a Turing Test to examine Ava (played by 
Alicia Vikander), an intelligent female robot created by fellow programmer Nathan (played by 
Oscar Isaac).3 The film takes a drastic turn when Ava manifests her self-awareness as much 
greater than that of her human counterparts and proceeds to kill her creator and abandon 
Caleb. This chapter explores the tension in the film between fears of robotics and a fascination 
with the female robot through the depiction of Ava as an embedded, human-like creature who 
possesses agency, rights and responsibilities. I argue that Ex Machina foregrounds Ava as an 
embodied, posthuman subject by locating her in a state of intersubjectivity with the natural, 
organic environment surrounding her. However, I also argue that Ava’s posthuman nature is 
hampered by patriarchal tropes in which she is depicted as a product of male desire; the film 
is centred around one man’s creation of a product of another man’s pornographic desire and 
it therefore draws attention to the ways in which Ava is gendered. The film plays on 
stereotypical forms of gender, embodiment and patriarchy and while it critiques them, it 
nevertheless invests in these tropes. Ex Machina therefore offers a complicated vision of a 
posthuman gendered robot. To explore these arguments, I will use critical posthumanism as 
a framework and I will analyse the film’s cinematography and iconography, particularly 
focusing on cinematic metaphors, and the film’s mise-en-scene.  
 
3 The Turing Test is an examination that was developed by Alan Turing in 1950 to assess whether a 




The representation of gender in humans, robotics and SF film  
 
 
Gender has been explored and interrogated by many researchers as a performative act. Judith 
Butler’s gender performance theory outlines that gender is constructed through one’s 
repetitive performance of gender: ‘gender is the repeated stylisation of the body, a set of 
repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance’ (1990: pp.43 - 44). Butler argues that gender roles are established 
by society and that masculinity and femininity are similarly social constructs. Butler thus writes 
that gender is performative: ‘there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that 
identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results’ 
(1990: p.25). She further notes that such behaviours are imitated and developed over time 
(1990: p.25). Likewise, Roger Andre Søraa posits that ‘performativity is a reinforcing process 
wherein one becomes the gender they perform’ and concludes that gendering is a process of 
constantly becoming gendered as one’s gendered identity evolves (2017: p.102). Gender as 
a performative action, then, suggests that gender only exists and is real when it is performed 
(Butler, 1990: p.40).  
 
 
The idea that performativity is a repeated process which dictates the gender that one performs 
can also be seen in the ways in which robots have been gendered. Roboticists tend to create 
humanoid robots that are designed to perform a gender. For example, HRP-4C is a humanoid 
robot created by AIST (2009) with very distinct feminine features. HRP-4C’s body is 
anthropomorphically designed with silver and black surfaces that ‘resemble a Barbarella-like 
costume, which accentuates her ample breasts and shapely, naturalistic buttocks’ (Robertson, 
2010: p.29). Her face and hands are covered in silicone and resemble skin. HRP-4C’s 
anthropomorphic robot body highlights how roboticists design robots to perform and enact 
44 
 
stereotypical ideas of gender. This exposes the gender assumptions roboticists make and is 
thus a problematic, and somewhat vexed, concept as it suggests that robots are an expression 
of gender norms. Robertson similarly argues that ‘how robot-makers gender their humanoids 
is a tangible manifestation of their tacit understanding of femininity in relation to masculinity, 
and vice versa’ (2010: p.4). We can see this also in SF film as there is a tendency amongst 
filmmakers to depict humanoid robots as performing a gender that is inherently stereotypical. 
The robots are very often created according to stereotypical norms and this reflects their 
creators’ ideas about gender. However, at the same time, the robots may draw attention to 
the very constructed and performative nature of gender itself since they are not human. 
Evidently, films like Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927), Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and 
Jonathon Mostow’s Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003) feature a stereotypical female 
robot that epitomises traditional forms of embodiment, such as the shapely feminine figure. 
Indeed, Lang’s (1927) female robot Maria is ‘irresistibly seductive, with her sashaying hips and 
art deco fetish-gear bodywork’ (Rose, 2015). Researchers Simone Alesich and Michael Rigby  
are highly critical of this stereotyped narrative and argue that ‘female robots in science fiction 
are often highly sexualised, their humanlike bodies accentuated by tight-fitting clothing to 
reveal their breasts and buttocks’ while male robots are depicted as ‘machine-like in 
appearance with accentuated, stereotypical male features such as large muscles and broad 
shoulders’ (2017: p.55). Robots in film are therefore represented as performing gender, 
highlighting their representation as an enforcement of stereotypical gender norms. Ex Machina 
similarly engages with ideas of gender as a performance. 
 
 
As I outlined in the introduction, there is a tension between the representation of Ava as 
intersubjective and as a highly sexualised, gendered robot. The analysis will therefore be split 
into two parts. Part one will explore embodiment, intersubjectivity and interconnectedness in 
Ex Machina and part two will explore representations of gender, patriarchy and pleasure in 
the film.  The two-part structure will highlight that whilst Ava presents the promise of a 
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posthuman, interconnected subject, her interconnectedness is hampered by the film’s 
employment of stereotypical ideas of embodiment and gender, and the sexualised, 
disempowered depiction of female bodies.  
 
 
Part One – Embodiment, Intersubjectivity and Interconnectedness in Ex Machina  
 
In this section I argue that Ex Machina characterises Ava as an embodied posthuman subject 
through a mise-en-scene and cinematography that visually and metaphorically conflate 
artificial and natural, organic and inorganic surfaces and textures, thereby situating Ava in a 
state of intersubjectivity rather than autonomous subjectivity. This is depicted through her 
connection to nature, her embodiment and the remaking of her body which enables her to ‘co-
evolve’ (Nayar, 2013) with other species. The connection between Ava and nature risks 
reinforcing the patriarchal alignment of women with nature - something which threatens them 
with embodied silence. However, I argue that Ava’s interconnected being foregrounds 
technology as well as nature and this changes the idea that the female is stereotypically 
connected to nature. I explore this argument through a posthuman perspective that focuses 
on co-evolving and interconnections, where the subject functions in relation to its surroundings 
and vice versa and identity congruently is constituted through these processes. 
 
In Ex Machina Ava’s posthuman embodiment is depicted through a mise-en-scene which 
reinforces her body’s connection to the environment and situates her in a ‘body-environment-
intersubjectivity’ (Gallagher, 2006: p.243). This is the notion that her body is constantly 
interacting and connecting with its environment. Indeed, Ava’s initial appearance onscreen 
blends the technological and organic as her cyborgian body is constructed upon human 
anatomy (0:12:21). Her shoulders, breast and torso are enclosed in a grey, mesh-like metallic 
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material while her face, hands and feet are ensconced in human flesh. Her transparent arms, 
stomach and legs showcase her artificial bones while the structure of her spine resembles the 
human vertebral column with artificial wires and cables materialising bones, tendons and 
ligaments.  Her metallic orb-like head is conspicuously skull-shaped, exhibiting delicacy and 
futuristic embodiment. The textural layering of human flesh with metallic surfaces and the 
fusing of artificial filaments therefore represents an ‘assemblage’ of the organic, artificial and 
natural (Nayar, 2013). This portrayal further suggests that there are ‘no essential differences 
or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic 
mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology’ (Hayles, 1999: p.3).  In critical 
posthumanism, the idea of assemblage rethinks subjectivity where human subjectivity co-
evolves with machines and animals, and vice versa (Nayar, 2013: p.19). Thus, Ava’s 
patchworked body foregrounds her posthuman embodiment as intersubjective as it melds the 
technological and natural.   
 
Ava’s intersubjectivity and posthuman embodiment are reinforced through visual metaphors 
that present the ‘biologic as the technologic’ (Dobrin, 2015). In a long shot of Ava (0:12:23) 
centrally positioned within the glass enclosure that is her room, the verdant, shrubbery marking 
the landscape behind her visually emphasises Ava’s intersubjectivity; the delicate surface of 
the appendages and stipules on the leaves and the rigid, unyielding surfaces of the branch 
and twigs mirror the delicacy of Ava’s flesh and durability of her metallic and transparent 
surfaces. Additionally, her techno-skeletal interior of fused fibres parallels the synaptic 
structure of the trees. This represents her body as ‘a congeries whose wetware, form and 
genetic structure [has] evolved not as instances of self-realization but as the instantiation of 
the connections between and across organic and non-organic forms’ (Nayar, 2013: p.99). 
Jennifer Henke similarly explores this scene in relation to embodiment and 
interconnectedness. She utilises Lena Trüper’s analysis of Ava’s body to argue that the woven 
metallic net covering Ava’s body resembles honeycomb and is a network metaphor (Trüper, 
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2016 in Henke, 2017: p.134). Henke argues that the diegetic whirring sound Ava makes when 
she moves ‘echoes a swarm of digital cicadas’ and further writes that the references to cicadas 
and bees on a visual and aural level ‘point to the swarm intelligence of the internet and they 
demonstrate how Ava is not only entangled in but moreover a product of this realm’ (2017: 
pp.134 - 135). The symbolism here thus implies Ava’s interconnection with nature and other 
life forms. 
 
Ava’s interconnectedness and posthuman embodiment are emphasised through the extreme 
example of Ava remaking her body in the penultimate scene of the film, where she dons the 
skin of Jade (an Asian AI) in order to conceal her artificial body. This scene climactically 
foregrounds Ava’s intersubjective condition as an ‘assemblage’ (Nayar, 2013) by de-
territorialising subjectivity. Before exploring this argument, it is imperative to define de-
territorialisation in relation to subjectivity:  
Deterritorialization implies the becoming nature of subjectivity in which the human 
is always in process because the human is within a drift, or circuit, of chemicals, 
chromosomes and molecules that very often lie outside the biology of the human. 
Evolution is the exchange of information across biologies (Nayar, 2013: p.99).  
Deterritorialisation is thus the process in which subjectivity transversally takes place ‘in-
between nature/technology; local/global; present/past – in assemblages that flow across and 
displace the binaries’ (Braidotti, 2018: p.4). Although Nayar exemplifies the ‘human’ as the 
actor in the deterritorialization process in his definition, he argues that this process applies to 
both human and non-human bodies (2013: p.99). In this scene, Ava proceeds to Nathan’s 
bedroom and discovers the lifeless bodies of the previous AI prototypes, which are stored 
inside the mirrored wardrobes (1:33:51). The following close-up shot of Ava detaching her 
dismembered arm (1:35:44) and replacing it with Jade’s arm and the close-up shot of her 
peeling Jade’s skin to place on her body are overt visual metaphors of assemblage; the 
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artificial fibres fuse and conjoin in a seamless sequence when Ava connects the fleshed arm 
to her artificial body. The diegetic sound of her ‘digital cicadas’ (Henke, 2017) coupled with 
the non-diegetic soft, xylophone notes on the soundtrack emphasises Ava’s morphing into 
another identity, thus sharing teleology with other organisms and species (Nayar, 2013). Her 
‘morphing’ into a new identity furthermore echoes the posthuman notion that identities, 
physiological and anatomical, are ontologically fluid as they are open to change and 
modulation (Nayar, 2013: p.79). Thus, the connection between Ava’s body and environment 
is so powerful and multifaceted that it  represents the posthuman vision of connections: there 
is ‘no body without mind, no individuality without connection, no connection without another 
dividuated life with its own concomitant reality, no affect without expression’ (MacCormack, 
2016). It could be argued that Ava is in a  ‘technobio-integrated circuit’ (Hayles, 1999: p.27) 
as her body is ‘an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-
informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction’ 
(Hayles, 1999: p.3).  Furthermore, the long shot of Ava admiring her fully fleshed naked body 
and hair is cinematically significant as it is a full shot which emphasises Ava’s new, ‘human’ 
body (1:36:59). It reaffirms posthuman views of assemblage and deterritorialized forms of 
existence, as her new body has been assembled with ‘open borders across which information, 
consciousness and identities flow’ (Nayar, 2013: p.99) –  for example, the identity of Jade 
‘flows’ through Ava through her wearing of her skin. Ava’s intersubjectivity is further intensified 
through the Jackson Pollock No.5, 1948 painting (1:36:18) which functions as a ‘network 
metaphor’ (Henke, 2017: p.137). The full shot of the canvas showcases eclectic, oscillated 
drips which symbolise wires, fibres and connexions (1:36:18). The placing of this shot within 
the montage of Ava donning Jade’s skin visually reinforces ‘exchange and linkage [which] 
ensures the deterritorialization of subjectivity because interiority is itself an open state: in 
constant communication with the exterior’ (Nayar, 2013: p.99). The remaking of her body 
therefore overtly concretises Ava’s interconnectedness and strengthens the promise of a 
utopian posthuman future in which human and non-human, artificial and organic come 




Although this scene is further evidence of Ava’s interconnectedness, there is a racial aspect 
that is more disturbing, and it can therefore be critiqued for its colonisation of Asian bodies. 
LeiLani Nishime explores this scene as a repetition of a history of racialised and dehumanised 
bodies in relation to the ‘whitewashing’ of Asian characters. She argues that Ava’s use of 
Asian body parts in Ex Machina  represents white female appropriation of Asianness (2017: 
p.35) as Ava repeatedly appropriates ‘uses of the Asian Other to exercise her own limited path 
through the strictures of gendered oppression’ (2017: p.36). Nishime thus critiques Ex 
Machina for its reinforcement of whitewashing and its indoctrination that a utopic technological 
future can only be achieved through the ‘erasure of transpacific migrating bodies’, arguing that 
the film presents a cultural anxiety about the irreducibility of race and gender in the midst of 
technological progress and innovation (2017: pp.45-p.46). There is a similar moment in A.I 
Artificial Intelligence when an African American mecha uses white skin to make himself more 
compatible and to emancipate himself. While the use of white skin in A.I Artificial Intelligence 
re-envisions abhorrent master-slave relationships in which the African American slave was 
dependent upon his master, the use of Jade’s skin in Ex Machina similarly expresses a 
‘cultural anxiety about the irreducibility of race’ (Nishime, 2017: p.46).  
 
 
Through mise-en-scene and cinematography that combine the natural and artificial, Ex 
Machina situates Ava in an intersubjective state where she is connected to nature and the 
natural world. However, just as the racial overtones expressed in the scene discussed above 
threaten to undermine Ava’s posthumanity, the promise offered by her interconnectedness is 
similarly held back by the imposition of a patriarchal gaze where she is depicted as a product 




 Part Two – Gender, Patriarchy and Pleasure in Ex Machina   
 
In this section I argue that Ex Machina offers a stereotypical, gendered robot and the film aims 
to critique this, but it falls short in its critique as it invests in tropes of patriarchy. By employing 
Laura Mulvey’s (1975) idea of the male gaze, I argue that the use of patriarchal tropes 
highlights the flawed nature of gendering robots in ways which conform to gender norms and 
male desires. I thus argue that the tension between aiming to critique these tropes and 
investing in them offers a complicated vision of a gendered robot.  
 
Throughout Ex Machina, Ava is metaphorically depicted as a fine piece of artwork through her 
femininity, sexualisation and innocence. These aspects of her embodiment signify a ‘to-be-
looked-at-ness’ (Mulvey, 1975). The sexualised representation of her as an object of pleasure 
represents the film’s complicity with stereotypical depictions of embodiment and therefore 
obscures the visionary posthuman utopia of interconnectedness and intersubjectivity. Indeed, 
the scene where Ava presents her clothed body to Caleb as a ‘surprise’ and the subsequent 
one of her undressing offer displays of her feminised body which elicit pleasure for Caleb and 
the viewer (0:40:30 - 0:45:16). The scene of Ava getting dressed begins with her informing 
Caleb that she has something to show him, suggesting a surprise as she instructs him to close 
his eyes whilst she enters a separate space and chooses an outfit from her wardrobe, which 
hosts a collection of patterned, stereotypically feminine, child-like clothes (0:40:30). She 
chooses a pastel lilac, floral sundress with a matching pastel blue cardigan and cream wool 
stockings, symbolic of her innocence and adolescence. Ava’s stylistic choices reinforce her 
youth and innocence as the subtle, diluted lilac and blue hues symbolise revival and renewal 
through a seasonal connotation to Purple Lilacs blossoming in spring; her cropped hairstyle 
further reiterates her vulnerability through its ‘waif-like’ aspect (Constable, 2018: p.295).  Ava 
delicately and tenderly dons her clothes with the precision of an artist painting a canvas and 
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this is framed within a tracking shot which focuses and zooms in on the layering of textures 
and concealment of her technical body (0:41:39). This shot, coupled with the diegetic sound 
of Ava’s ‘digital cicadas’ (Henke, 2017: p.134) and the non-diegetic xylophonic notes, further 
evokes a sense of innocence and fragility, reinforcing the sense that she is a delicate piece of 
art. As Ava returns to Caleb, the camera cuts to a tracking shot, partially featuring her back 
and lower arms as she gently tugs the sleeves of her cardigan over her hands – a seemingly 
natural, non-verbal cue of nervousness and a gesture which emphasises her youthfulness 
(0:43:29). Her innocence works alongside her sexualisation as it is through her vulnerable, 
youthful look and stylistic choices that she appears as an artwork; through this, Ava is 
sexualised as an object of pleasure.  Indeed, the wide shot framing both Caleb and Ava as 
she presents herself to him is reminiscent of the cinematic conventions of the male gaze 
(0:42:56); upon instructing Caleb to open his eyes, Ava stands still momentarily before twirling 
around to give Caleb a full view. The metaphorical depiction of Ava as artwork thus reinforces 
Jennifer Robertson and Anne Balsamo’s  claim that the process of gendering robots shows 
that ‘gender belongs both to the order of the material body and the social and discursive or 
semiotic systems within which bodies are embedded’ (Robertson, 2010: p.4; Balsamo, 1997: 
p.36). For example, the height disparity between Caleb and Ava signifies Ava as ‘the image’ 
and Caleb as the ‘bearer of the look’ (Mulvey, 1975). Caleb’s seated stance permits him to 
gaze up and down at Ava as an ‘erotic spectacle’ (Mulvey, 1975), akin to the position of the 
spectator gazing up at the screen in the auditorium and analogous to the art-lover appreciating 
art, with the glass sandwiched between them further signifying that Ava is an exhibit. This 
representation of Ava as a piece of artwork to be looked at and desired (Mulvey, 1975) thus 
obscures her interconnectedness and intersubjectivity through its abject connotations of 
objectification. 
 
The film draws greater attention to the male gaze as Ava enacts a stereotypical performance 
of gender. Ex Machina exploits the male gaze and the gendering of AI and this draws our 
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attention to the film’s complicity with the performative nature of gender. This is depicted 
through Caleb’s voyeurism and Ava’s assent at being objectified.  When Ava presents herself 
to Caleb, she gauges his attraction by asking him how she looks, to which he responds ‘you 
look…good’ (0:43:18); the elongated pause indicates Caleb’s desire as he struggles to 
express his attraction lucidly. Constable writes that ‘given the dowdy nature of Ava’s outfit, 
Caleb’s discomfort is more explicable as a response to being confronted by a physical 
embodiment of his pornography preferences’ (2018: p.295) as it is later revealed that Ava was 
built on Caleb’s pornography profile. Caleb’s role as a voyeur and Ava’s performance of 
gender are further foregrounded through the direct questions Ava asks him: 
‘Are you attracted to me? You give me indications that you are…The way your 
eyes fix on my eyes and lips. The way you hold my gaze…or don’t. Do you think 
about me when we aren’t together? Sometimes at night, I’m wondering if you’re 
watching me on the cameras…And I hope you are’ (0:43:54 - 0:44:45) 
Ava’s calculated reference to the gaze and her confession that she ‘hopes’ Caleb is watching 
her is characteristic of the femme fatale as it signifies her manipulative intention to beguile 
Caleb through her sexualised body. Halberstam critiques the highly stereotyped 
representation of gendered AI in film, arguing that ‘technology is given a female identity when 
it must seduce the user into thinking of it as desirable or benign’ (1991: p.451). Evidently, 
Ava’s performance of gender is stereotypical and thus presents the film’s complicity in its use 
of patriarchal tropes. In Gender Trouble, Butler writes that gender is performed through the 
‘repeated stylisation of the body; [it is] a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory 
frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance’ (1990: pp.43 - 44). Ava 
thus performs gender by repeatedly stylising herself as a ‘seductive’ figure ‘to-be-looked-at’ 
(Mulvey, 1975). The very performative nature of this scene draws the audience’s attention to 




In the scene that follows, Ex Machina reverses Caleb’s voyeurism onto the audience through 
constructing a mise-en-scene and cinematography that situates the audience as voyeurs. This 
scene features Caleb watching Ava on his TV screen as she undresses (0:45:01 - 0:45:56). 
By implicating the audience, the film makes explicit its critique of the male gaze and the 
gendering of technologies. It does this through a metacritical lens by making the viewers 
uncomfortable and this suggests that there is no escape from these perverse forms of gazing 
and objectifying.  This scene begins with a wide shot framing Ava as she undresses and 
features a shadowy hue and hazed pixels which indicate that Caleb is watching Ava from the 
monitors in his bedroom (0:45:00). This is evidence of his scopophilia as the ‘shifting patterns 
of light help promote the illusion of voyeuristic separation’, giving Caleb ‘the illusion of looking 
in on a private world’ (Mulvey, 1975). In the scene, as Ava turns to face the screen, the camera 
cuts to an extreme close up of Caleb’s eyes which are transfixed to the screen in awe and 
showcases the slight pinching of his eyes as he smiles in appreciation. The smile, which is not 
framed within this shot, further reiterates his voyeurism as he engages in a private world and 
his pleasure can thus be classed as scopophilic as it arises from using another person, Ava, 
as an object of sexual stimulation through sight (Mulvey, 1975). Indeed, the eyeline trajectory 
between the close up cut of Caleb’s hands clutching the screen and Ava undressing combined 
with the poignant, evocative synth-like piano notes cinematically amplify his scopophilic desire 
in gazing at Ava. These paralinguistic gestures represent his ‘curiosity and the wish to look’ 
(Mulvey, 1975). Whilst this highlights Caleb’s desire, as a viewer it makes us uncomfortable 
and there is thus a metanarrative attention to the male gaze. Katie Jones similarly analyses 
the gaze, scopophilia and voyeurism in Ex Machina through a psychoanalytic and feminist 
approach.  She argues that the point of view shots of Caleb watching a television screen 
‘align[…] his voyeurism with the audience’s, suggesting that his gaze may be a surrogate for 
our own or, perhaps more accurately, the heterosexual white male viewer’ (2016: p.26). The 
cinematography therefore renders the audience as voyeurs as Caleb’s appreciative gaze 
mirrors the audience’s intrigue as they simultaneously engage in the viewing. However, as 
they are not offered distance from these shots, this metacritically increases the audience’s 
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discomfort as the audience become implicated in the watching and objectifying of Ava. This, 
in turn, undermines Ava’s interconnectedness and intersubjectivity by depicting her as a 
product of desire.   
 
 
The film draws greater attention to gender, sexualisation and power through presenting the 
character of Kyoko (played by Sonoya Mizuno) as a ‘domestic slave’ (Tadiar, 2004; Nishime, 
2017: p.40). Kyoko is a robot designed by Nathan to provide domestic and sexual services 
and this representation thus critiques how the film reduces female bodies to a lesser status 
and invests in structures of exclusion. After seeing Nathan tear up a drawing done by Ava 
from the TV screen in his room, Caleb searches for Nathan and instead finds Kyoko (0:57:33). 
As he calls her name and asks her where Nathan is, Kyoko begins to unbutton her blouse 
(0:57:54). Kyoko, who has been designed to be mute, interprets Caleb’s questioning as an 
initiation of sex. Her actions further suggest that she has been repeatedly used and abused 
as a sex worker. Her sexually submissive nature thus draws attention to how she has been 
exploited as a result of her sexualised embodiment. In relation, Nishime writes that as Kyoko 
is unable to even experience emotions without transforming them into labour, into service with 
a smile, her body is evidently not her own (2017: p.40). Nishime further argues: 
The consistent, though unremarked upon, depiction of technologically enabled 
service labour as female locates the source of labour exploitation in the [feminised] 
bodies themselves rather than globalized economic systems. Instead of seeing a 
system of labour that marks particular bodies as subject to exploitation, we view 
certain bodies as inherently less valuable and, therefore, exploitable (2017: pp.40-
41). 
Ex Machina therefore reimagines gendered female bodies as disposable and draws attention 
to the objectification of female robots as sexual objects. However, Caleb’s reaction to Kyoko’s 
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stripping: ‘What the fuck? No, no, no, no! Stop! You don’t have to do that. Don’t do that’ 
(0:57:58), complicates this reading. His response aligns with the viewers’ reception of this 
scene; just as we are made to feel uncomfortable in the scene where Caleb is depicted as a 
voyeur, this scene establishes feelings of commiseration as it evokes images of body 
exploitation, highlighting a tension between an investment and critique in themes of 
objectification. 
 
The tension between a critique and exploitation of gender and patriarchy is further expressed 
through Caleb’s assistance in Ava’s escape. This suggests that whilst the film critiques 
patriarchy by enabling Ava to escape, the critique is diluted by the fact that the narrative ends 
up being about a woman saved by a man and stuck between two men, highlighting how the 
narrative is predominantly centred around male intentions and male desire. After Nathan 
informs Caleb of his plans to reformat Ava, Caleb becomes concerned and expresses this 
concern to Ava during a power cut which Ava orchestrates in their next session.4 When Caleb 
confesses Nathan’s intentions to Ava during their sixth session, Ava responds ‘Caleb, you 
have to help me’ in an extremely vulnerable voice (1:16:25). This is framed in a medium close-
up shot and Ava’s palms, which are pressed against the glass in between her and Caleb, 
suggest she is reaching out to him (1:16:32). Caleb instructs Ava to cause a power cut to 
enable him to reprogram the lockdown procedure which will enable Ava to escape and Nathan 
to remain locked in.  Although the film critiques the idea of patriarchy by enabling Ava to 
escape, her vulnerability and dependence on Caleb nonetheless suggest that she is at the 
mercy of another man. This reiterates stereotypical ideas of male dominance and female 
subservience and therefore emphasises the tension between exploiting patriarchy and 
critiquing it.    
 
4 Earlier in the film, Ava reveals to Caleb that when she charges her batteries, she is able to reverse 
the power flow and cause power cuts (0:52:43); during the power-cut, all power is deactivated, 




Ex Machina further explores the tension between posthumanity and gendered embodiment 
through gendered forms of violence and revenge Ava and Kyoko take upon Caleb and Nathan 
to emancipate themselves. By reversing oppressive forms of violence to achieve 
emancipation, the film fulfils its critique of patriarchy and stereotype. When Nathan discovers 
Caleb’s plot to help Ava escape, he punches Caleb and proceeds to search for Ava who has 
indeed escaped her room;  a tracking shot focuses on Ava who is walking freely in the hallway 
where masks of AI faces are displayed, and this is accompanied by ominous, dramatic, non-
diegetic music, prefiguring Ava’s violence and revenge. The camera cuts into a series of close 
up and extreme close up shots of Ava and Kyoko, who has just entered the scene, in soft-
focus lighting. They appear to be whispering inaudibly and Ava gently taps Kyoko’s arm in 
what seems like a form of communication, or, conspiracy. The focus is on their soft, feminine-
like features – their flushed cheeks, pouting lips and full lashes (1:28:42 – 1:29:04). Ava gently 
squeezes Kyoko’s fingers, highlighting female solidarity and further hinting at their collusion 
(1:29:06). Nathan, who has been watching Ava on his surveillance cameras, enters the hall to 
order Ava to return to her room. However, Ava charges towards him and uses brute force to 
choke him in what Henke argues is a ‘reversed rape scene’ (2017: p.139). The amalgamation 
of eerie pulsating synth beats and Ava’s ‘digital cicadas’ (Henke, 2017) becomes louder and 
more hostile and sounds like a high voltage of electricity as she attacks Nathan.  After Nathan 
gains control of Ava, he slashes her arm, fragmenting it from her body, and as he drags her 
across the corridor, Kyoko stabs him in the back. This reiterates a gendered form of violence 
as her revenge re-enacts her sexual exploitation through symbolising the phallic and this is 
reinforced by Ava who similarly stabs Nathan in a phallic motion (1:30:46). The aspects of the 
violence combine to offer a critique of male dominance and oppression. This is further 
emphasised when Ava betrays Caleb by trapping him in the research facility. After stabbing 
Nathan, Ava heads to his office where Caleb is and asks him ‘will you stay here?’ (1:33:30) 
whilst she repairs herself and remakes her body in a separate room. Unaware that these words 
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will dictate his fate, Caleb agrees. After she has repaired herself, Ava steps out and activates 
the lockdown procedure Caleb reprogrammed for her escape. However, in doing this, Ava 
entraps Caleb. As she passes the room in which Caleb is locked and ignores his screams and 
banging on the door, the intense music crescendos (1:37:49 - 1:38:40). The subsequent long 
shot of Caleb pulling the handle and screaming her name heightens the ruthlessness of Ava’s 
actions as the diegetic sounds are silenced, making Caleb’s suffering inaudible (1:38:47). 
While Ava’s actions are symbolic of the femme fatale - a recurring patriarchal trope - she 
nevertheless escapes and frees herself from the men in the narrative. This therefore signals 
how the film both invests in patriarchy and critiques it, and this, in turn, offers an ambivalent 
view of a posthuman gendered robot. 
 
The depiction of Ava and Kyoko as vengeful and violent exposes the fears, dangers and 
anxieties around robotics. Indeed, Ava is a crucible for fears and anxieties and the film exploits 
this. This further threatens to undo the posthuman vision of co-existence and co-evolution of 
humans and robots. The final scene where Ava escapes can be interpreted as a reworking of 
Eve’s sin from the biblical story of Adam and Eve. This reading examines how Ava, as Eve, 
represents the ‘Technological Singularity’ and thus further emphasises how Ex Machina 
engages with the fears of robotics through a gendered perspective. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the ‘Technological Singularity’ is the fear that Artificial Intelligence will surpass human 
intelligence and become self-aware (Vinge, 1983). In this process, humans will be reduced to 
the status of secondary intelligent creatures whilst Artificial Intelligent entities will be the 
dominant species at the centre of the universe (Vinge, 1993). Abrahamic religions maintain 
the belief that Eve, upon temptation, ate from the forbidden tree and as a result of her actions, 
she and Adam were banished from the Garden of Eden and sent to Earth as punishment. 
Ava’s killing of Nathan re-enacts Eve’s eating from the forbidden tree; however, her escape 
into the new world, unlike Eve’s banishment, signifies freedom as she leaves the prison-like 
facility and enters the Garden of Eden. Moreover, in the biblical tale, Adam and Eve begin to 
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feel embarrassed and conscious of their naked bodies after consuming the forbidden fruit and 
thus use leaves as coverings; in Ex Machina , Ava enters the garden fully clothed – a contrast 
to previous depictions of her bare, naked body. Halberstam utilises Haraway’s version of the 
cyborg - ‘a machine both female and intelligent’ to explore the religious tale of Eve’s sin 
(Haraway, 1990 in Halberstam, 1991: p.440). Halberstam writes that: 
The female cyborg replaces Eve in this myth with a figure who severs once and 
for all the assumed connection between woman and nature upon which entire 
patriarchal structures rest. The female cyborg, furthermore, exploits a traditionally 
masculine fear of the deceptiveness of appearances and calls into question the 
boundaries of human, animal, and machine precisely where they are most 
vulnerable - at the site of the female body (Halberstam, 1991: p.440). 
Halberstam’s reading thus accords with the reading conducted above of Ava as a reformed 
Eve who seeks liberation. While the Biblical tale of Eve’s sin is connotative of transgression 
and punishment, Ava’s killing of Nathan and trapping Caleb connotes freedom, thus 
representing her as enacting the ‘Technological Singularity’. Indeed, as the traditional 
meaning of Eve is the mother of life, Ava, as a play on Eve, may symbolise the mother of 
artificial intelligent beings from the perspective of the ‘Technological Singularity’. The allegory 
of Ava as Eve and the depiction of her enforcing the ‘Technological Singularity’ thus expresses 
the fears and threats of robots through a gendered perspective.  At the same time, the film 




Overall, this chapter argues that Ex Machina depicts tensions between sexuality, gender and 
intersubjective posthumanity. The film engages with the obsession and fascination humans 
have towards the female robot through the feminised depiction of Ava. Ex Machina 
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characterises Ava as an embodied posthuman subject through executing a mise-en-scene 
and cinematography that visually and metaphorically conflates the artificial and natural, 
organic and inorganic surfaces and textures, thereby situating Ava in a state of intersubjectivity 
rather than autonomous subjectivity. Ava’s intersubjective posthumanity is furthermore 
illustrated through her symbiosis with nature and the natural world, in which she appears as a 
‘congeries’ and ‘assemblage’ (Nayar, 2017). While the film engages with a posthuman rhetoric 
of interconnectedness and intersubjectivity, the sexualised, disempowered depiction of the 
female robots problematises their interconnectedness; as Ava and Kyoko are objects of male 
desire, their agency and latent desires can only be exercised through gendered parameters 
such as their sexuality and patriarchal tropes like objectification. By implicating the audience 
as voyeurs in the gaze, the film offers a metanarrative critique. Ex Machina thus plays on 
stereotypical forms of gender, embodiment and patriarchy and invests in these tropes; 
however, at the same time, it subtly critiques them through the satirical undertones and 
indictments of conflating robotic technology and gender. The film thus implies that by 
gendering technologies, we will not be able to escape longstanding patriarchal strictures of 
oppression and objectification, highlighting the irony and tension between sexuality and 
technology and warning against conflating the two. Ex Machina therefore offers a complicated, 
somewhat ambivalent, vision of a posthuman robot and emphasises tensions in the 











This chapter will draw on ethics, sociological and psychological studies and critical 
posthumanism to examine the ethical implications of posthuman care in Jake Schreier’s 
award-winning Robot and Frank (2012). This is a science-fiction comedy-drama film set in the 
near future in small-town upstate New York and it focuses on the relationship between an 
older man, Frank Weld (played by Frank Langella), who is suffering from dementia and his 
robot (voiced by Peter Sarsgaard), a healthcare aid who has been designed to assist, monitor 
and interact with him. Frank’s son Hunter (played by James Marsden) is reluctant to visit Frank 
or put him in a care facility and so he purchases the domestic robot to relieve himself of his 
familial responsibilities. Rather than presenting a robot who possesses evil intent and seeks 
self-awareness, Robot and Frank envisions a world in which posthuman robotic care will be 
conventional and advantageous and a world in which humans and robots will co-exist through 
establishing a positive, affective care relationship between Robot and Frank. I argue that while 
the film explores and satirises the anxieties around using robots for personal care, it 
nevertheless overcomes these by emphasising growing interdependence between Robot and 
Frank where they are presented as heteronomous, embedded subjects. I argue that this 
depiction challenges the categorical binaries of man vs. machine. I will explore this through 





The representation of Robot was inspired by the style of caretaker robots in Japan. It was 
designed to look like ASIMO by Honda (“Robot and Frank”, 2019). ASIMO is a humanoid robot 
created in 2000 and is able to ‘understand pre-programmed gestures and spoken commands, 
recognize voices and faces and interface with IC Communication cards’ (Obringer and 
Strickland, 2007). ASIMO was designed as a helper robot - to help people in stores and 
education and to help older people, people with disabilities and learning difficulties. The robot 
in Robot and Frank is similarly presented as a healthcare aid to help improve and stimulate 
Frank’s life. 
 
The use of healthcare robots and the ethical considerations 
 
As the world’s population, specifically the aging population, increases, this has simultaneously 
resulted in a statistical crisis of care. In 2018, the World Health Organisation (WHO) stated 
that ‘between 2015 and 2050, the proportion of the world's population over 60 years will nearly 
double from 12% to 22%.’ They also predict that ‘by 2020, the number of people aged 60 years 
and older will outnumber children younger than 5 years.’ (WHO, 2018). As there is an 
increasing number of older people and a change in the demographic balance of many Western 
populations, this change has often been interpreted and mediatised as a ‘crisis’ as the 
statistics are used to promote fearmongering and a sense of urgency. Indeed, ethicists Robert 
Sparrow and Linda Sparrow examine demographic changes with cynicism. They argue that:  
Media reporting on them [older people] encourages fear of an old, static population 
and of tax and health systems unable to cope. There are warnings of the threat of 
increasing numbers of old people demanding more prescription medicines, taking 
up expensive hospital beds for prolonged periods of time, and requiring more from 
the already stretched health and aged-care sectors (2006: p.144) 
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The changes in demographics and ‘statistical panic’ may therefore contribute to the increased 
interest in using robots in healthcare. Indeed, Jacob Shatzer, writer in posthumanism and 
transhumanism, postulates that humanoid robots are ‘the solution to the problem of an aging 
population as the fear is that economics will just not work out for humans to maintain the roles 
of caregivers’ (2012: p.84). 
 
Robotics and AI are thus being wider used in healthcare as a result of changes in 
demographics and the statistical panic this has established. Colin Jervis, Director of Kinetic 
Consulting and Healthcare and Public Sector Consultant, examines how robotic healthcare is 
establishing a posthuman future. He identifies three types of robots: ‘operational robots (which 
are used in surgery), humanoid robots (which walk and move like humans, performing care 
tasks), and miniature robots (which may one day be released into humans to maintain and 
repair them)’ (Jervis, 2005: p.26 in Shatzer, 2012: p.84). Jervis furthermore argues that there 
are four main ways that robots can assist the elderly and the chronically ill:   
[They can] make up for cognitive decline (remind patients to take medicine); 
enable patients and caregivers to interact more efficiently (via video links); collect 
data and monitor patients (heart rate, blood-sugar levels); and assist with domestic 
tasks (cooking and cleaning) (Jervis, 2005: p.26-27 in Shatzer, 2012: p.84). 
Evidently, there are a number of positive benefits of robotic healthcare. Indeed, Sparrow and 
Sparrow claim that ‘voice-activated robots might relieve pressures by playing a general service 
role in aged care, fetching food and drink, opening doors, controlling home appliances and 
moving objects around’ (2006: p.145). They claim that such robots can help older people 
maintain their independence and feel empowered through providing them with a greater sense 
of control and autonomy (2006: p.145). Examples of these robots are ‘My Spoon’ by SECOM 
and ‘Riba’ by Riken and these have been evaluated by ethicists Amanda Sharkey and Noel 
Sharkey. ‘My Spoon’ is an automatic feeding robot, designed to help people who struggle to 
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eat on their own and ‘Riba’ is a robot who can lift and set down humans from a bed to a 
wheelchair and vice versa. Sharkey and Sharkey thus conclude that these robots give users 
‘greater autonomy and independence and protect their physical welfare and keep them from 
danger’ (2010: p.31). Likewise, ethicist Sherry Turkle (2017), whose research focuses on 
interactions between older people and robots, observes that those who interacted with Paro, 
an advanced therapeutic seal created by AIST in Japan, experienced a ‘robotic moment’. She 
writes that this refers to ‘our state of emotional – and philosophical – readiness to seriously 
consider robots not only as pets but as potential friends, confidants, and even romantic 
partners’.  Evidently, Turkle’s research on robotics highlights the positive aspects of using 
robots in healthcare as the ‘robotic moment’ she refers to signifies an affective relationship in 
which the robot and human can develop a connection.  
 
Although the use of robotics may induce empowerment and independence amongst older 
people, frail people and people with disabilities and cognitive illnesses, there are multiple 
ethical and moral concerns that have been raised. Sharkey and Sharkey outline the main 
anxieties associated with posthuman care: 
(1) the potential reduction in the amount of human contact; (2) an increase in the 
feelings of objectification and loss of control; (3) a loss of privacy; (4) a loss of 
personal liberty; (5) deception and infantilisation; (6) the circumstances in which 
elderly people should be allowed to control robots (2010: p.123). 
Sparrow and Sparrow similarly concur with this list, arguing that a future in which a robot cares 
for, feeds, washes, monitors and entertains a human represents a dystopia rather than a 
utopia (2006: p.152). Sharkey and Sharkey further argue that a ‘dull and dirty’ task such as 
feeding/carrying allows the older person to interact and bond with the person performing these 
tasks; use of a robot therefore ‘removes an opportunity for detailed and caring human 
interaction’ (2010: p.29). Sparrow and Sparrow likewise argue that ‘any reduction of what is 
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often already minimal human contact would, in our view, be indefensible’ (2006: p.152). They 
thus claim that ‘handing over cleaning and other household tasks to Robocare—or its 
equivalent—would most likely be detrimental to the well-being of frail older people’ (2006: 
p.152). Furthermore, Sharkey and Sharkey write that depriving older people of interaction and 
bonding violates rights outlined in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ 
(2010: p.29). The concerns raised by Sharkey and Sharkey suggest that while assistive robots 
in healthcare are convenient and offer physical safety, they can be socially reductive and 
objectifying (2010: p.29). To elaborate on the former, Riba, for example, is a safer option for 
the patient and carer due to its physical strength and construction in comparison to a human 
carer who may risk injury during the process of carrying the patient. And yet, these healthcare 
aids endanger basic forms of social engagement by eliminating an opportunity to talk when 
tasks such as lifting are carried out, potentially isolating and dehumanising the patient.  
 
Analysis of Robot and Frank  
 
Robot and Frank explores the parameters of care, what it means to care and how Robot cares 
for Frank. Throughout the film there are moments which express the anxieties associated with 
robotic care. However, the film challenges these anxieties and overcomes them by 
establishing a positive caring relationship between Robot and Frank. Prior to receiving Robot, 
Frank was living in squalor, unable to maintain himself or his house and he was portrayed as 
an aging person with an emphasis on his frailty.  After working with Robot, Frank’s life 
improves, and their relationship similarly transforms from a caring relationship to friendship, 
highlighting the effects of affective engagement. I explore how this destabilises the boundaries 
between the artificial and natural, human and machine by alluding to a future in which 




The film exposes the uneasiness associated with robotic care by alluding to Robot’s artificiality 
and reinforcing his ‘difference’ to humans. The initial representation of Robot emphasises his 
non-human nature as he typifies the traditional, boxy, white robot: he lacks facial affect; he is 
not clothed; and his head resembles a space helmet, as Frank indeed comments. When he is 
initially introduced, Robot’s mechanical, monochromatic materiality directly contrasts with 
Hunter and Frank’s natural, imperfect, organic bodies. Robot’s pristine, smooth surface is at 
odds with the texture of Frank’s ageing skin, enforcing his otherness (0:10:25). Robot’s distinct 
whiteness juxtaposes the muted, neutral tones of the soil and garden, thereby alienating him 
from the natural world and human world. Furthermore, the contrast in the diegetic sound of 
the birds and crickets and Robot’s mechanical whirring emphasises the differences between 
human and machine, natural and artificial. His namelessness foregrounds his lack of human 
identity as he does not come with a name and nor does Frank ascribe one to him. Robot’s 
lack of a name is therefore expressive of and results in his objectification as he is often referred 
to as an ‘it’ in the film. Robot’s materiality, then, expands the boundary between robot and 
machine by emphasising his otherness to us. Frank expresses antagonism and dislike towards 
the idea of having a robot carer as he asks Hunter: ‘you’re going to leave me with this death 
machine?’ (0:10:43). This highlights the anxieties associated with robots as the label ‘death 
machine’ iterates the fear that the robot is ‘a pathological cyborg programmed to be relentless’ 
(Redmond, 2004: p.156). Furthermore, Hunter explains that Robot is ‘like a butler’ (0:10:00), 
suggesting he is subordinate and inferior as the label ‘butler’ connotes ‘servant’. This therefore 
renders Frank as Robot’s superior, which reifies the anthropocentric, normative view of man 
as the ‘geological force capable of affecting all life’ (Braidotti, 2013: p.5).  
 
The scene discussed above (Robot’s introduction) further engages with the issue around care 
in wider society. As Frank is reluctant to use Robot, Hunter claims: 
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What am I supposed to do, dad? What am I supposed to do? I drive up here every 
week, ten hours round-trip, and you don’t even want me here. I don’t see my kids. 
Forget it. But the robot is staying because it was expensive as hell and you’re 
going to do what it says or you are going to the memory centre because the last 
thing I need is your dying to be my fault too (0:12:39). 
Hunter’s outburst is expressive of the struggles of care and alludes to the supposed ‘burden’ 
of care. Cahill et. al conducted a study on how the care of older adults affects their family 
members. They found that children whose parents required care struggled to provide support 
and older parents, likewise, were reluctant to ask their children for involvement in their daily 
routines, medication and doctor’s appointments (2009: p.7). Cahill et. al further found that 
older parents gave priority to their children’s own families and jobs (2009: p.7). Their findings 
highlight the struggle of care and this is evidently expressed in Robot and Frank as Hunter’s 
threat to send Frank to the memory centre and the implied notion that his visiting of Frank is 
straining familial relationships with his kids, suggests that care for Hunter is a ‘burden’. Robot 
as an alternative, then, reinforces a point earlier discussed that changes in demographics and 
the supposed ‘burden’ of care contribute to the use of robotic care. The film thus presents 
robotic care as more viable and efficient and this draws attention to the dystopian idea that 
human care is failing. 
 
Although the film depicts Robot as alien and other, his otherness is counterbalanced through 
the positive care relationship he develops with Frank.  By highlighting the positive effects of 
affective engagement, the film presents Robot as a subject embedded in a human, natural 
and interconnected world. This complicates his alienation and otherness as Robot’s care of 
Frank can be considered as an ‘attitude of care’ (Kittay: 2011: p.52). This is an idea outlined 
by feminist philosopher, disability scholar and ethicist, Eva Feder Kittay, who elaborates that 
care as an attitude is a ‘positive, affective bond and investment in another’s well-being’ (2011: 
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p.52). This is represented through the domestic caring roles carried out by robot, which are 
illustrated in a series of three consecutive birds-eye view shots of Robot gardening, cooking 
and shaving Frank’s hair (00:16:32). Each birds-eye view shot employs a circle motif which 
symbolises a sense of universality and interconnectedness of the artificial world (Robot) and 
the natural world (Frank). The shot of the garden features a circle filled with soil and scattered 
leaves and the bowl of food similarly features verdant vegetables that are circularly shaped. 
The mise-en-scene in these three shots further reflects Robot and Frank’s interrelatedness; 
the colour palette and textures of the soil and vegetables, which are presented as wholesome 
and organic, evokes images of the Earth and the natural world, intensifying the interconnected 
nature of Robot and Frank. The last shot, of Robot shaving Frank, is perhaps the most 
significant in presenting Robot’s care as an ‘attitude’ (Kittay, 2011: p.52). There is a sense of 
dependence that is powerful in this shot; Robot performs a fairly intimate task in which Frank 
is seen as very vulnerable as we can conspicuously see the razor blades come into contact 
with Frank’s frail skin. Frank is thus able to develop trust in Robot who is able to keep Frank 
safe when performing intimate, dangerous care tasks. This, in turn, increases Robot’s 
investment in Frank’s wellbeing (Kittay, 2011: p.52) and thereby emphasises his 
interconnectedness as he grows closer to Frank. The representation of robot as embedded 
into the human and natural world thus undermines the alienation and otherness established 
earlier. Nayar explains that embeddedness 'sees the human's subjectivity as in-formed by 
lived experiences in an environment and the lived experiences as shaped by the subjectivity 
in a reciprocal relationship’ (2013: p.21). Robot’s subjectivity is certainly established through 
his experiences with Frank (through care and nurture) and Frank’s embeddedness is also 
predicated through his companionship with Robot.  
 
Reciprocity is expressed in Robot and Frank’s relationship, where they both rely on each other, 
establishing an ‘assemblage’ (Nayar, 2013) of man and machine. Frank, who is an ex-convict 
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and a jewel thief, realises that he can use Robot to his advantage as Robot’s programming is 
not equipped to distinguish the difference between legal recreational activities and illegal ones. 
Frank thus uses Robot to help him resume his career as a burglar. Robot’s programming 
means that he must help improve Frank’s physical and mental health by making him partake 
in activities that will stimulate the mind; Frank chooses the immoral activity of lock-picking. 
After planning and seamlessly carrying out their heist (the robbery of an antique copy of Don 
Quixote from the local library), Frank praises Robot for being able to open locks whilst at the 
same time reminisces about his children: ‘You were crackerjack at those locks. I never could 
show Hunter how to do that stuff…I wanted to’ (00:32:45). While this claim expresses 
sentiment and loss, it is predicated upon the implication that Robot is compensating for this 
loss by filling in for Hunter, Frank’s biological son. Their relationship here can thus be seen as 
existing affectively in a state of heteronomy: Frank, as the paternal figure, is able to teach 
Robot his skills, whilst Robot is able to fulfil his role of stimulating Frank by engaging him in 
an activity he enjoys. It could thus be argued that Frank experiences what Turkle calls a 
‘robotic moment’; this is the emotional readiness to consider robots as friends and confidants 
(Turkle, 2017). Robot’s care aligns with Benner et al’s idea of care as a ‘set of relational 
practices that foster mutual recognition and realisation, growth, development, protection, 
empowerment…and relationships that assist others to cope with their weaknesses while 
affirming their strengths’ (Benner et.al, 1996: xiii). This scene takes place in a mise-en-scene 
which evokes an ambient, domestic setting as the subdued warm sepia tones of lamps 
engender a nostalgia, accentuating the familial relationship between Robot and Frank. By 
enmeshing together fundamental aspects of the human – memory and passion, and the 
principal nature of the Robot, to care - Robot and Frank postulates an ‘assemblage’ (Nayar, 




Robot and Frank’s interdependence is further foregrounded through their intertwined 
destinies. During a walk which Robot has scheduled for Frank to improve his health and 
fitness, Frank expresses his distaste for healthy eating and exercising: ‘I would rather die 
eating cheeseburgers than live off steamed cauliflower’ (00:17:20). Robot responds: ‘what 
about me Frank? If you die eating cheeseburgers, I’ll have failed, and they’ll send me back to 
the warehouse and wipe my memory’ (00:17:27). In this scene, the camera transitions from a 
long shot to a medium shot and focuses in on Robot and Frank whose gazes are locked 
together, emphasising the view of Robot and Frank as heteronomous bodies reliant upon each 
other. Kittay writes that dependency and assistance are advantages and affirms that ‘when 
we acknowledge how dependence on another saves us from isolation and provides the 
connections to another that makes life worthwhile, we can embrace needed dependencies’ 
(2011: p.56). Thus, Robot’s statement that his fate depends on Frank’s decisions challenges 
humanist notions of autonomy and situates Robot and Frank in a ‘man-computer symbiosis’ 
(Mitchell, 2003: p.7) through entwining their destinies in a care relationship. This buttresses 
Haraway’s posthuman perspective on interdependence: ‘the machine is us, our processes, an 
aspect of our embodiment’ (1991: p.80) and depicts posthuman care as positive in that it 
establishes ‘connections’ (Kittay, 2011: p.56) and promotes growth.  
 
While the film explores the positive effects of affective engagement, at the same time, it 
expresses the anxieties towards robotic care. However, it does this through a satirical lens to 
critique the fearmongering that often comes about when the topic of robots integrating into 
society arises. During an event for the renovation of a local library, Frank and Robot meet the 
librarian Jennifer’s (played by Susan Sarandon) robot Mr. Darcy, who, unlike Robot, has no 
face, arms or legs; he resembles a printer rather than a conventional robot, emphasising his 
non-human nature. Frank suggests that the two robots should ‘mingle together’, to which Mr. 
Darcy replies: ‘I have no functions or tasks that require verbal interaction with the VGC-60G’ 
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(00:36:13). Frank’s response, ‘So, when all humans are extinct, you’re not going to start a 
robot society?’ (00:36:21), refers to the ‘Technological Singularity’ (Vinge, 1993). This idea, 
which has been analysed in the previous chapters, describes the point at which robots and AI 
will surpass human beings and become the primary entities of the planet. However, whilst 
Spielberg’s A.I Artificial Intelligence (2001) and Garland’s Ex Machina (2015) explore the 
Technological Singularity in relation to the dangers and anxieties associated with the 
developments in robotics, Robot and Frank satirises this concept as Frank asks this question 
with a cynical and condescending tone of voice. The film thus presents the humanist fear of 
the ‘de-centring of man’ (Braidotti, 2013) and human exceptionalism and human 
instrumentalism as somewhat absurd and, rather, it challenges this through the caring 
relationship and companionship between Robot and Frank.  
 
Frank’s protectiveness towards Robot, in which he treats him as a human and thus as a moral 
creature with rights and responsibilities, further overcomes the anxieties associated with 
robotic care. Upon visiting Frank, his daughter, Madison (played by Liv Tyler) switches Robot 
off, as she claims, ‘you can’t just whisk away all your responsibilities onto a robot’ (00:48:21). 
However, when she later switches Robot back on to clean the house and denies that this is 
why she switches him back on, Frank is livid. He shouts at his daughter: ‘The robot is not your 
servant…you don’t turn him on and off like he’s a slave…I need him…he’s my friend’ (00:51:59 
- 00:52:28). The reference to Robot not being a ‘slave’ or ‘servant’ reminds the viewers of the 
transformation of Frank and Robot’s relationship, as Frank considers Robot to be a ‘butler’ 
when they first meet. The film presents a challenging view of the care relationship, relationality 
and reciprocity as it alludes to the underlying element of slave labour through Madison’s 
supposed exploitation of the robot. Madison’s actions remind the viewers of the danger of 
otherness and hierarchies and the ways in which some (human and non-human others) are 
characterised as lesser. In relation, care in the United Kingdom and United States of America 
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is often performed by people with less socio-economic power, such as migrant workers from 
central and eastern European countries who work for low pay (Shutes, 2011). The film aims 
to deal with these ethical issues by reinforcing the relationality and reciprocity between Robot 
and Frank as Frank does not just perceive Robot as any other household appliance, like a 
hoover or printer which can be switched on and off when needed, but rather as a moral human 
being who has rights. Amelia DeFalco, writer in the field of posthuman care and ethics, 
similarly explores this scene in her analysis of Robot and Frank as ‘affective engagement’. 
DeFalco argues: 
[The link between Robot and slavery] conjures a history of exploitation, 
dehumanization, and racism that complicates the film’s posthuman politics, 
reminding viewers of the racialized, sexualized, gendered power dynamics that 
have historically organized the relationship between the privileged classes and 
their affective laborers in the United States (DeFalco, 2016).  
She further argues that the image of Robot as a slave ‘confirms and critiques humanist 
hierarchies, the racist and sexist ideologies historically used to justify the subjugation of non-
white, non-male populations as less-than-human’ (DeFalco, 2016). Robot and Frank thus 
draws attention to the ways in which otherness, hierarchies and exclusions are constructed. 
This makes us question who counts as human, who is more human and who is valued as 
human. While the representation of Robot as a slave certainly expresses the potential 
immorality of using robots for domestic roles, Robot and Frank’s companionship somewhat 
eases this tension as their relationship is mutually received in which Frank and Robot care for 
and care about each other.  
 
Robot and Frank’s interdependence, heteronomy and relationality, which have been built up 
throughout the film, reach a climax when Robot must sacrifice himself in order to save Frank 
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at the end of the film. After the success of their first heist, Robot and Frank commit one last 
job. However, as the police become involved, Robot becomes a liability due to his holographic 
virtual memory storing data and evidence which can be used against Frank. Robot thus urges 
a very reluctant Frank to wipe his memory. A medium close up shot of Robot and Frank in an 
affectionate, hug-like embrace symbolises Robot’s sacrifice as altruistic and binds the two in 
symbiosis (01:18:47). This scene features non-diegetic ambient, emotional music coupled with 
the diegetic sound of Robot whirring. After switching off Robot, the camera cuts into an 
extreme close up and focuses in on Robot’s head falling onto Frank’s shoulder akin to that of 
a child and parent hugging, with the background blurred, emphasising their intimate, affective 
embrace and Robot’s martyrdom. This constructs a mise-en-scene which accentuates Robot 
and Frank’s affective companionship as heteronomous, embedded subjects by fusing together 
the natural and artificial, man and machine. This therefore reinforces the inclusive nature of 
caring and aligns with Nel Noddings’ view of care as ‘feeling with’ and involving ‘reception’ 
(2013: p.49). Noddings explains the receptive notion of care:  
I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a 
duality… My motive energy flows toward the other…I do not relinquish myself; I 
cannot excuse myself for what I do. But I allow my motive energy to be shared; I 
put it at the service of the other. It is clear that my vulnerability is potentially 
increased when I care. But my strength and hope are also increased, for if I am 
weakened, this other, which is part of me, may remain strong and insistent (2013: 
p.49-52). 
Evidently, Robot, in symbiosis with Frank, puts his energy at the service of the other (Frank), 
resulting in him being ‘weakened’ so that Frank, his counterpart, remains strong (Noddings, 
2013: p.52). DeFalco  (2016) similarly explores the interconnectedness between Frank and 
Robot and claims that this scene ‘implies a breach of multiple boundaries’, further postulating 
that ‘this close attention to these fragmented bodies—Frank’s hand, Robot’s operational 
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console—suggests haptic convergence between organic and synthetic, old and new, worn 
skin and smooth surface.’ Robot’s sacrifice for Frank, then, foregrounds care as ‘affection, 




Overall, through fusing together man and machine, artificial and natural, I argue that 
Robot and Frank dismantles these categorical binaries that are central to humanism 
by establishing Robot and Frank as reciprocal, relational and embedded beings. 
Cinematic images of the unification of machine and man in Robot and Frank 
furthermore evoke the posthuman view of the human as an interconnected, 
heteronomous, interdependent species. This chapter explores how an ageing 
population has contributed to a statistical ‘crisis’ in care and therefore an increased 
use and interest in robotics in care. Through the care relationship between Robot and 
Frank, this film suggests that robotic care is an ‘attitude’ (Kittay, 2011: p.52) as Robot 
invests in Franks life and establishes a positive, affective bond. This chapter highlights 
that care is portrayed as establishing dependencies through which the carer and cared 
for can develop connections with each other and I argue that these dependencies are 
positive. Dependency is at odds with the traditional humanist, and especially the 
neoliberal, subject. In its vision of dependency as integral to humanity, the film thus 
challenges our view of the human. I further argue that while the film expresses the 
anxieties of robotic care and alludes to the non-human nature of Robot, it nevertheless 
overcomes these anxieties by satirising them. Robot and Frank therefore offers an 
ambivalent form of posthumanism, highlighting how literary explorations of caregiving 
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helps interrogate relationships between the humanoid and the human and illustrate 




















Overall, this thesis has explored how the representation of the humanoid robot in Steven 
Spielberg’s A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001), Alex Garland’s Ex Machina (2015) and Jake 
Schreier’s Robot and Frank (2012) deconstructs the boundaries between the human and 
machine, natural and artificial, organic and inorganic. Through the theoretical lens of critical 
posthumanism and a focus on the films’ iconography, cinematography and mise-en-scene, 
this thesis examines how the depiction of the humanoid robot in these films destabilises 
human subjectivity, sovereignty and universality. This study scrutinises how this causes us to 
question who or what can be considered human. While each film expresses concerns and 
anxieties regarding robots and AI, the totem of the robot as an intersubjective, interconnected 
being displaces cultural representations of the human as superior and dominant and, instead, 
envisions a posthumanity of co-evolution and co-existence. This thesis therefore draws 
attention to how the films gauge cultural anxieties and also challenge them. The findings thus 
suggest that the chosen films offer a complicated view of the posthuman robot. 
 
The first chapter, ‘Empathy and Otherness in A.I Artificial Intelligence’, finds that A.I Artificial 
Intelligence uses the robot child to draw attention to structures of exclusion, difference and 
dominance demarcated by the human. This chapter furthermore addresses the central aim of 
the thesis - how SF film challenges our ontological boundaries and causes us to question who 
counts as human. Similarly, the second chapter, ‘Gendered Robots in Ex Machina’ argues 
that Ex Machina offers a complicated vision of a posthuman robot through its representation 
of Ava as an intersubjective, yet highly gendered and sexualised being. This chapter thus 
posits that the film makes acute its critique of the gendering of technologies by displaying the 
outcomes of this - objectification and irreducibility of the female subject. The third chapter, 
‘Care and Relationality in Robot and Frank’, argues that Robot and Frank evokes a 
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posthumanity by depicting a relationship in which Robot and Frank are reciprocal, relational, 
embedded subjects. The film expresses anxieties associated with robotic care; however, they 
are weakened through Robot and Frank’s affective, heteronomous relationship. The three 
chapters therefore achieve the overall aim of the thesis which is to unpick how SF film 
interrogates relationships between the robot and the human. 
 
By analysing the film’s iconography, cinematography and mise-en-scene and by applying 
critical posthuman theory to this analysis, this thesis has demonstrated how the visual 
language of the film draws attention to the representation of the robot as an interconnected 
being. The theoretical approach highlighted how the three films offer a critique of 
anthropocentrism and traditional notions of humanism, such as human exceptionalism and 
human instrumentalism. Furthermore, this approach enabled me to examine trends and 
crossovers in the three films. For example, each chapter addresses how the films depict a 
history of dehumanisation and marginalisation of others: the first chapter addresses this by re-
imagining historical tragedies, such as the Holocaust and Slavery; the second chapter 
explores this idea through representing patriarchal structures that threaten to dehumanise and 
reduce women; and lastly, the third chapter engages with this idea through references to slave 
labour which establishes a history of the exploitation of migrant workers. The iconographic 
analysis of this in relation to critical posthumanism enabled me to explore how the films’ 
cinematic modes of convention such as, the cinematography, diegesis and mise-en-scene, 
establish a visual image which critiques structures of exclusion. This approach clearly 
illustrates how the films critique the anthropic principle; however, it could be supplemented by 
incorporating postcolonial theory and critical race studies to further examine how structures of 
exclusion and coercion are used to separate the human from the ‘other’. While this thesis 
examines how SF films displace and deconstruct boundaries of the natural and artificial, it 
could further be expanded by surveying a wider array of films that could offer a greater view 
of how SF films address the issue of what it means to be human. Another implication for further 
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study is to include transhuman theory which would provide a nuanced perspective of how the 
physical and literal imbrication of the human and machine further disentangles human 
subjectivity and human exceptionalism. 
 
Overall, this thesis has highlighted that the chosen SF films collectively offer a critique of 
human subjectivity, rationality and universality and evoke posthuman futures concerned with 
the intersubjectivity, interconnectivity and co-evolution of robots and humans. This thesis thus 
provides a more holistic view of the robot as, while it certainly addresses how the films express 
anxieties about robots, it finds that the representation of the robot in these films as an 
interconnected being causes us to question who, or what, can truly be considered human. If 
sentience, consciousness and empathy are reserved solely for humans, what does it mean to 
be human in an age where humanoid robots similarly exhibit empathy, sentience and 
consciousness? This study furthermore raises deeper, cultural issues about how humans treat 
and other non-humans and by bringing these issues to the fore, this thesis questions and 
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